ACCRETION ELECTIONS: MAKING EMPLOYEE
CHOICE PARAMOUNT

Michael J. Frankt
It is declared hereby to be the policy of the United States to
protect the exercise by workers of full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing ....
Employers and unions have long engaged in legal wrangling over the
size and parameters of the bargaining unit, believing that these attributes
will often determine whether a union can initially get its foot in the door
and later remain a viable entity within the workforce. Generally unions
initially prefer smaller bargaining units,2 for obvious reasons: the union
needs a consensus among workers that adoption of the union is in their best
interests, and the probability of the union achieving this consensus is
inversely proportional to the number of parties involved. 3 The smaller the
unit, the fewer the employees the union needs to convince to vote for the
union. The fewer the votes needed, the greater the chances of an election
victory. Furthermore, it is often less expensive to proselytize a smaller
group, and the union that can expand inexpensively can devote its
t The author is an attorney specializing in labor and employment law. He wishes to
thank Professor Samuel Estreicher of the Center for Labor and Employment Law at New
York University School of Law for his helpful comments and suggestions.
1. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
2. See Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product
Markets, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 3, 10 (1993) ("[U]nions seek elections on the basis of the
smallest organizing unit .... "). Or, as Professor Estreicher has also observed, "unions seek
the largest possible unit that they can organize effectively." Id. Thus, they are not opposed
to large units, so long as they can prevail in organizing them. See JULIUS G. GETMAN ET AL.,
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND THE LAW 28 (2d ed. 1999) ("When a union organizes,

it almost invariably limits itself to a portion of the employer's work force.... Most unions
will choose the largest unit in which they think they will be successful.").
3. Cf Stewart J. Schwab, Collective Bargainingand the Coase Theorem, 72 CORNELL
L. REv. 245, 267 (1987) ("The largest impediment to reaching an efficient agreement,
according to many scholars, is coordinating the desires of multiple parties."). The
probability of reaching a consensus also decreases as the scope of the proposed action
increases, which is frequently a function of the size of a given group of individuals.
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 67 (1994). The larger the group, the more
varied are the interests that seek representation in the union.
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economic resources to battling rival unions or the employer. Not
surprisingly, then, employers initially favor larger bargaining units for
converse reasons: 4 they would prefer not to bargain with the union, and it is
more difficult and expensive for unions to organize larger units.5 Because
the employer's chances of prevailing in a representation election increase
as the size of the unit increases, employers will generally argue that a larger
unit is the only appropriate unit in any given case.6
Because the size of the bargaining unit is often a determining factor in
the unionization of the workforce, the contours of the bargaining unit are
obviously important to employers, employees, and unions.7 An accretionthe addition of a small group of employees to an established bargaining
unit without first holding an election--often results in modification of the
union's, the employers', and employees' initial preferences as to unit size.
Once a bargaining unit is up and running, the union is frequently happy to
expand its domain; after all, more employees bring more tribute in the form
of union dues, and increased size usually means increased strength. But
this is true only so long as the new employees will swear fealty to the
existing union, rather than to some competing union. Therefore, unions
will often support accretions when they will result in the addition of loyal
union members, but will oppose them when there is a real possibility of
losing majority status. Employers, never blind to their own interests,
4. See, e.g., Hamilton Test Sys., New York v. NLRB, 743 F.2d 136, 138 (2d Cir.
1984) (stating that after the regional director decided that the appropriate bargaining unit
would consist of five groups of non-clerical employees at one site, the employer objected
that the unit should be larger, encompassing four sites, while the union objected that the unit
should be smaller, encompassing only three groups of non-clerical employees at one site).
5. Cont'l Web Press Inc. v. NLRB, 742 F.2d 1087, 1090 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[S]mall,
homogenous units usually are cheaper to organize than larger ones, and often are more
effective. Fewer workers have to be contacted, and there is less danger that conflicts of
interest will prevent the formation of an effective majority coalition.").
6. GETMAN, supra note 2, at 31-32 ("Thus the larger the unit that the Board insists on,
the better off employers are.").
7. Judge Posner has explained the general view on preferences for larger or smaller
units.
In general, the larger the unit the better off the employer is, and the smaller the
unit the better off the union is. The larger the unit is-that is, the more
employees it has-the more difficult it will be for the union to obtain the
majority vote that it needs in order to be designated the exclusive bargaining
representative for the unit. This is not only because it takes more resources in
absolute terms to get more votes (a national political election is more costly
than a local one), but also because the members of the unit are more likely to
have divergent interests with respect to tradeoffs among wages, fringe benefits,
job security, and workplace safety. This will make it difficult for the union to
appeal to a majority and, even if it gets a majority, will make it difficult for the
union to formulate a coherent set of demands and enforce those demands by an
effective strike threat.
Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 988, 1008 (1984).
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consider some of these same factors, although from a different perspective.
They will frequently support accretions that will weaken an unpopular
union, place the accreted employees safely in a unit that isn't too
demanding (as opposed to a competing unit that will fight for higher
wages), or result in the employer having to bargain with fewer unions
(thereby decreasing expenditures of both time and money).8
In assessing the propriety of accretions, the National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB") has addressed these competing interests through its
"community of interest" balancing test. 9 Unfortunately, however, the test
provides nothing more than rough guidelines for the Board to follow;10 it
can lead to entirely different results in nearly identical cases; and it is
frequently perceived as a tool used by the Board to expand the population
of a bargaining unit according to the whims of the prevailing union.
Although the balancing test is ostensibly designed to ensure that no
accretion will occur unless all the employees of the newly created unit have
substantially the same interests, the test is tortured by its inherent
vagueness, and the multiplicity of its factors make the test easy to
manipulate." Perhaps because unions and employers are the only private
parties to litigate accretion cases, it often seems that the community of
interest test ends up serving primarily the unions' interests, and only in rare
instances does the test serve the interests of employers or the self-

8. "The employer can be expected to prefer units drawn along the same lines as the
company's internal divisions." Pac. Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1032, 1043 (9th
Cir. 1978). The Ninth Circuit also suggested that "this preference should be accommodated
if feasible." Id.
9. In applying the community of interest test the employer "also has an interest which
should be considered." Id.
10. This is in part due to the fact that Congress intentionally left its mandate vague,
thereby delegating to the Board broad power to define an "appropriate" unit. RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 590 (5th ed. 1998) ("The costs of legislative
enactment imply that statutes will often by ambiguous. After all, one way to reduce the cost
of agreement is to agree on less-to leave difficult issues for future resolution by the
courts," or administrative agencies.).
As to Congress's choice of the word "appropriate," Judge Danny Boggs has noted that
"'Appropriate' is one of the most wonderful weasel words in the dictionary, and a great aid
to the resolution of disputed issues in the drafting of legislation. Who, after all, can be
found to stand up for 'inappropriate' treatment or actions of any sort?" Cleland v. Bronson
Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 271 (6th Cir. 1990) (Boggs, J.) (discussing the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act's mandate that emergency rooms
provide "appropriate" screenings of patients); see also Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 507 (1985) (White, J., dissenting)
("'Appropriate' is not an ideal statutory term.").
11. "It can readily be seen that community of interest is a vague standard which does
not lend itself to mechanical application. It is a multi-factor criterion, and it is rare in any
give case that all of the factors point conveniently in the direction of the same size unit."
ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW 276 (12th ed. 1996).
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determination rights of employees. 2 The most important parties, the
employees, are frequently left without a direct and independent voice in the
community of interest balancing. Only when the employees' interests
coincide with those of the union or the employer do their interests get
championed, and then only secondarily and to the extent deemed
financially prudent by the union or the employer. In cases where there are
two competing unions and the employer elects to ally itself with one of
them, employees whose bests interests would be served by the denial of
any accretion have no way to make their voices heard, even though the
accretion decision may have a profound affect on the means by which they
earn their livelihood and support their families.
Because the prevailing accretion procedure has substantial defectsincluding the fact that it denies employees basic freedoms of association
and self-determination that Americans hold dear-this article proposes that
the Board abandon the overwhelming community of interest balancing test,
and replace it with a system of secret ballot elections. Under the proposed
election system, an accretion could only occur if a majority of the voters in
both the group to be accreted and the established unit cast their ballots in
support of the accretion. As discussed more fully below, an election
system has many advantages, not the least of which is showing respect for
employee autonomy and the right of employees to choose for themselves
the outcome that best serves their interests. An election system that
empowers employees to decide whether to join any of the existing
bargaining units or remain autonomous will prove beneficial to labormanagement relations. The proposed election system also gives employees
of the preexisting unit a voice in the accretion, thereby ensuring that the
union or the employer does not jeopardize their interests in permitting an
accretion. Finally, the election system will provide employees in the
preexisting unit with an effective means of voicing any concerns about
their union's performance as the employees' representative.
To demonstrate the need for a revised accretion standard, Part I of this
article outlines the present system by which accretions are presently
analyzed. This section focuses on the substantial community of interest

12. The Board and the courts claim that they have tried to minimize this problem.
According to the Ninth Circuit, it will ignore an employer's suggestions for defining the
bargaining unit where they are designed to thwart unionization:
Of course, when the employer seeks to disavow its own internal structure and
instead proposes a unit which joins the subject employees with employees
uninterested in union representation, we accord almost no weight to the
employer's claimed administrative interest. A unit gerrymandered to serve the
employer's self-interest is no better than one gerrymandered to serve the
union's organizational objectives.
Pac. Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1032, 1043 n.18 (9th Cir. 1978).
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test utilized by the NLRB, discussing each factor as it has been treated by
the Board and the courts. Part I easily demonstrates the manipulability of
the balancing test, and shows its inability to provide certainty or
predictability in accretion cases. Part II introduces another system, based
on employee choice, whereby accretions are determined by secret ballot
elections. Because different concerns arise where accretions are sought by
employers, employees, and unions, this proposal sets out election rules that
vary slightly depending on the proponent of the particular accretion. In
each case, however, an accretion can be accomplished only if a majority of
both the group to be accreted and the preexisting unit vote to support the
accretion.
Part III discusses the advantages of this proposed election system,
including its promotion of employee choice, the rescuing of accretion cases
from potential biases of the Board, and its superiority to the community of
interests test in ensuring that the employees' interests are served by
accretions. In Part IV, the article considers theoretical shortcomings of an
election system. These include the potential for creating units where the
employees have conflicting interests, and its failure to take into account the
hardships to employers, unions, and the employees themselves that an
unwise but popularly supported accretion might entail. Despite potential
shortcomings of the proposed system, the article concludes that an election
system is workable and preferable to the community of interest balancing
test presently utilized by the Board.
I.

THE ACCRETION DOCTRINE: AN OVERVIEW

Among the fundamental freedoms granted to employees by the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") is the right to organize a union
and to bargain collectively through that union.' 3 Recognizing that there is
strength in numbers, and aiming to prevent internecine rivalries among
competing unions and "divide and conquer" tactics by employers, 4 the

13. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994) ("Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... "). Of course, employees had these rights
even before the enactment of the NLRA, and certainly by 1935 mainstream judges did not

seriously question these rights. See HADLEY

ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND:

RESTORING A JURISPRUDENCE OF NATURAL RIGHTS

145 (1994) ("None of the so-called

conservatives or laissez-faire judges had questioned the right of workers, as free men, to
form into unions or to engage in any legitimate association."). What the NLRA did was
provide the government with a mechanism for punishing employers who refused to hire,
retain, or bargain with union employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (a)(3) (1994).
14. As William Gould observed:
The essential concern of the courts has been that the collective interest should
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NLRA permits each unit to retain only one union to act as its agent for
purposes of collective bargaining with the employer. 5 Once in place, this
union acts as the exclusive bargaining agent for all employees in the unitat least with respect to mandatory subjects of bargaining-even when a
substantial minority of employees prefer another union or no union
representation at all."

A union can become an employee's designated collective bargaining
agent through various means. These include a union's victory in a secret
ballot election conducted by the regional director of the NLRB;17 voluntary
recognition by the employer that the union has majority support;" a Gissel
bargaining order issued by the Board;' 9 a successorship; 20 or an accretion.
govern over individual advantages once the majority of workers in an
appropriate unit have designated the union as their bargaining representative. In
large part, this rule exists because individual contracts could serve as an
obstacle to organization and permit employers to "divide and conquer."
WILLIAM B. GOULD, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 64-65 (2d ed. 1986).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994) ("Representatives designated or selected for the purposes
of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining .... "). This "majority rules" concept may seem unfair to
the minority that does not want representation by the union. Nevertheless, it is similar to the
manner in which the American political system works. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 6 ("[O]nce the Constitution was ratified
virtually everyone in America accepted it immediately as the document controlling his
destiny. Why should that be? Those who had opposed ratification certainly hadn't agreed
to such an arrangement. It's quite remarkable if you think about it, and the explanation has
to be that they too accepted the legitimacy of the majority's verdict.") (footnotes omitted).
It's worth noting, however, that the Supreme Court has given union members the ability to
opt out of paying dues for other than essential services provided by the union.
Communication Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
16. This exclusivity is the rule even where a union fails to represent the employees'
interests or where an employee simply would prefer to deal directly with his employer. See
Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975) (two black
employees sought to bypass the union and deal directly with the employer about working
conditions for blacks). Because of the contract bar, election bar, and certification year bar, a
union can remain the exclusive bargaining agent for a unit while these bars are in place,
even where not a single employee supports the union.
17. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1994).
18. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994) ("Representatives designated or selected for the
(emphasis added). But an employer commits an
purpose[s] of collective bargaining ....
unfair labor practice by voluntarily recognizing and bargaining with a union that it
mistakenly thought had majority support when recognized. Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers
v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
19. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596 & nn.7-8 (1969). The board
will issue an order for the employer to bargain with a union under Gissel where the
employer committed unfair labor practices that purportedly prevent the holding of a free and
fair election.
20. An employer must recognize and bargain with a union that represented the
employees of a unit acquired by the employer where the union employees are a substantial
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This article focuses only on the latter process, accretion.
Simply put, an "accretion occurs whenever new employees are added
to an existing bargaining unit. ' 21 More precisely, accretion is a process by
which employees considered to have common interests with an existing
bargaining unit are deemed to be part of that bargaining unit, without first
having the opportunity to voice their opinion in an election.22 As the
Seventh Circuit explains it:
An accretion is the addition of a relatively small group of
employees to an existing bargaining unit where these additional
employees share a sufficient community of interest with unit
The additional
employees and have no separate identity.
employees are then absorbed into the existing unit without first
having an election and 23are governed by the unit's choice of
bargaining representative.
Although an accreted employee can agitate for a decertification
election under §9 (but only within the overall unit), this is no substitute for
the right to choose not to be accreted in the first place.24
Accretions frequently occur when an employer with a unionized unit
acquires another plant where the new employees have similar interests with
their brethren in the preexisting, unionized unit. 25 "Typically, a union will
represent employees at one facility. Then, the employer will acquire an
additional nearby facility, and the union will argue that the contract should
extend automatically to the workers at the additional facility., 2 6 Similarly,
where an employer opens another plant or store, its new employees might
and representative complement of the new employer's workforce. Fall River Dyeing &
Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 41 (1987); NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc.,
406 U.S. 272, 280 n.4 (1972).
21. Teamsters Nat'l United Parcel Serv. Negotiating Comm. v. NLRB, 17 F.3d 1518,
1520 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
22. Kaynard v. Mego Corp., 633 F.2d 1026, 1030 (2d Cir. 1980). As some courts have
noted, accretion is much like a unit determination. NLRB v. Security-Columbian Banknote
Co., 541 F.2d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 1976).
23. Consolidated Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 754, 756-57 (7th Cir. 1982); see

NLRB v. Illinois-American Water Co., 933 F.2d 1368, 1377 (7th Cir. 1991).
24. Boire v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 479 F.2d 778, 798 (5th Cir. 1973) ("'Nor does the
procedure for decertification under section 9 of the Act provide an adequate remedy for
these employees."').
25. Illinois-American Water Co., 933 F.2d at 1377 ("The common accretion situation
occurs when new employees are absorbed into an existing unit because of the similarity of
their job duties to those of the unit employees."); 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 404
(Patrick Hardin ed., 3d ed. 1992) ("An employer's acquisition or construction of an
additional operation or facility after the execution of the contract frequently gives rise to a
claim of accretion."); see, e.g., Armco, Inc. v. NLRB, 832 F.2d 357, 359 (6th Cir. 1987)
("This case arises from Armco's acquisition of an Allied Chemical coke plant .... ).
26. Andrew Strom, Rethinking the NLRB's Approach to
Agreements, 15 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 50, 68 (1994).

Union Recognition

108

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 5:1

be accreted to the collective bargaining unit already in existence at its
primary location, and thus the new employees inherit whatever union
represents the existing employees.27
Accretion can raise important issues for employers, unions, and
employees. 28 The accretion question will determine which union (if any)
represents the accretable employees, whether the preexisting collective
bargaining agreement extends to the group to be accreted, whether the
employer has a duty to bargain, and with which union it has this duty.
Distinct problems arise where employees of an acquired shop could be
accreted to more than one existing unit represented by different unions, and
the respective unions each fight for control. 29 Determining whether an
accretion occurred, and which unit sustained the accretion, is particularly
important for the employer in this situation: if there has been an accretion
to one of the units, the employer must bargain with the union for that
enlarged unit, and it commits an unfair labor practice if it bargains with the
* 30
wrong" union.
Because there is no direct judicial review of unit determinations and
accretions,3 1 when an employer is not sure whether the reviewing Court of
Appeals will concur in the Board's finding of an accretion, its only
recourse is to refuse to bargain with respect to the accreted employees; or,
if the employer is asserting the accretion, to decline to bargain with the
rival union that claims to represent the accretable group. 32 Cases involving
27. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25.
28. See, e.g., NLRB v. Masters-Lake Success, Inc., 287 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1961) (per
curiam) (employer violated § 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) by recognizing and bargaining with the
union where the union and employer mistakenly believed that a new branch store was an
accretion, rather than a new bargaining unit).
29. See, e.g., NLRB v. Security-Columbian Banknote Co., 541 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1976)
(enforcing cease and desist order where employer acquired an operational plant, and
committed an unfair labor practice by bargaining with the Graphic Arts Union that
represented its original plant, when it should have bargained with the Pressmen's Union that
previously represented some of the employees of the acquired plant).
30. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1994).
31. Parties can sometimes obtain judicial review of an accretion issue by seeking an
injunction. See Kaynard v. Mego Corp., 633 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1980) (affirming the district
court's injunction as modified); Boire v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 479 F.2d 778 (5th Cir.
1973) (affirming district court's injunction under 29 U.S.C. § 1600)). Also, some courts
"have held that a district court deciding a section 301 case may determine whether a
bargaining unit is appropriate where a decision of that issue is essential to a resolution of a
breach of contract claim .. " Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc.,
690 F.2d 489, 523 (5th Cir. 1982).
32. Accretion questions may be arbitrated if the parties agree to this course of action.
But the Board will only defer to the arbitrator's determinations if they are consistent with
the Board's own accretion standards. Boire, 479 F.2d at 794. As discussed more fully
below, the Board's standards are vague and case-specific, thereby requiring an arbitrator to
have supernatural powers to divine what the Board would do if presented with the facts of a
particular case. Employers can obtain Board review of accretion questions by petitioning to
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a union-supported accretion arise when an employer refuses to recognize a
union as the exclusive representative of a group of employees (the
purportedly accreted employees), and the Board charges the employer with
a violation of § 8(a)(5). 3 3 Similarly, employer-supported accretions come
to the Board through an unfair labor practice charge when the employer
bargains with a union as the representative of the purportedly accreted
employees. The employer must assert his accretion arguments as a defense
to the unfair labor practice charge, which is usually initiated by the
neglected union.34
That's exactly what the employer was forced to do in NLRB v.
Security-Columbian Banknote Co., where Security operated a plant that
designed and engraved stocks and bonds." A unit of eight employees was
represented by the Pressman's Union, while another unit performing offset
printing was represented by the Graphic Arts Union. When Security
acquired another plant, whose offset printers were represented by the
Pressmen's Union, both the Pressman's Union and the Graphic Arts Union
claimed that they were the exclusive bargaining representative for the
newly acquired offset printers. In this situation, the employer was forced to
decide whether: (1) an accretion to the existing unit of offset printers had
occurred, in which case the Graphic Arts Union would be the new
employee's agent; (2) an accretion to another existing unit had occurred, in
which case whatever union represents that unit would be the new
employee's collective bargaining agent; or (3) no accretion had occurred, in
which case the new unit would inherit the Pressman's Union as the
representative of the employees under the successorship doctrine.
The resolution of this dilemma obviously has profound implications
for the accreted employees, not to mention the various competing unions
and the employer. As it was, Security-Columbian Banknote Co. guessed
wrong: it thought that the acquired unit was accreted to the existing unit of
seek clarification of an existing bargaining unit. See Archer Daniels Midland Co. 333
N.L.R.B. 81 (2001).
33. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 759 F.2d 1477, 1478
(9th Cir. 1985). A union might seek an accretion pursuant to an accretion clause in a
collective bargaining agreement. "[Tihe situation usually posed in the accretion clause
cases is a union majority already established in one area which seeks to swallow up another
separate group of employees without the need for an election." Pratt-Farnsworth,Inc., 690
F.2d at 525 n.17 (5th Cir. 1982). The Board "has taken an extremely narrow view of
permissible contractual accretions." Boire, 479 F.2d at 796. The Board "has refused to find
the contract a bar to a petition without its own independent determination that the new
facilities represented an accretion to the contract unit." THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW,
supra note 25, at 406.
34. Pac. Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1032, 1035 n.3 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Direct
review of a unit determination is unavailable. The employer must refuse to bargain and then
raise the issue in the subsequent unfair labor practice proceedings.").
35. NLRB v. Security-Columbian Banknote Co., 541 F.2d 135, 136-37 (3d Cir. 1976).
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offset pressmen, and thus was represented by the Graphic Arts Union.
However, the Board found that no accretion had occurred, and that Security
had committed an unfair labor practice by bargaining with the Graphic Arts
Union. Accretion can be a sticky business, and the Board has not made life
any easier for employers, employees, or unions to determine whether an
accretion has occurred.
Because the Act grants the Board the power to determine "the unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining," 6 it must decide
when small groups of employees are accreted to unionized bargaining
units. Although it has broad discretion to determine the appropriate unit
and thus whether a group should be accreted, the Board has arguably
cabined this discretion through its use of the so-called "community of
interest" balancing test.37 As the discussion below demonstrates, however,
it is intellectually dishonest to label the Board's accretion analysis a "test."
The only thing tested is credulity, by the Board's assertion that it uses the
"substantial community of interest" analysis to decide accretion cases
consistently and impartially.
A.

The "Overwhelming Community of Interest" Balancing Test

As the name of the inquiry suggests, the overwhelming community of
interest balancing test is designed to ascertain whether the employees to be
joined have a sufficient level of mutual interest with the existing unit, such
that combining the two groups for purposes of collective bargaining is
warranted. As the Ninth Circuit has put it, to be accreted, the new
employees must "have no separate identity, and therefore nothing
approaching a distinct community of interests, apart from the larger
group."38 Or as the First Circuit has observed: "A group of employees is
properly accreted to an existing bargaining unit when they have such a
close community of interests with the existing unit that they have no true
identity distinct from it." 3 9 The party asserting the accretion doctrine has
the burden of proving its applicability,# because this party is attempting to

36. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1992).
37. NLRB v. Lundy Packing Co., 68 F.3d 1577, 1579 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing how
discretion is based on the Board's expertise in labor matters and the need for flexibility in
shaping the bargaining unit in particular cases).
38. Pac. Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1032, 1041 n.16 (9th Cir. 1978); see
Consolidated Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 754, 756-57 (7th Cir. 1982) ("An accretion is
the addition of a relatively small group of employees to an existing bargaining unit where
these additional employees share a sufficient community of interest with unit employees and
have no separate identity.").
39. NLRB v. St. Regis Paper Co., 674 F.2d 104, 107-08 (1st Cir. 1982).
40. GHR Energy Corp., 294 N.L.R.B. 1011, 1016 (1989) (adopting the AL's finding
of no accretion).
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alter the status quo. But in most cases, the assignment of the initial burden
is irrelevant.
The factors used by the Board to determine whether a legitimate
accretion has occurred are generally the same factors employed to
determine the appropriateness of a bargaining unit in representation
proceedings. 4' On the surface, this makes sense, since both accretions and
initial determinations of the appropriate bargaining unit are comparable
decisions that involve similar issues.42 When deciding whether a proposed
unit is appropriate or a proposed accretion would be proper, the Board is
supposed to ensure an outcome that maximizes employee freedom of
association and which furthers industrial peace. 43 To achieve this goal, the
Board utilizes the community of interest balancing test, whether dealing
with unit determination or an accretion." The only difference is the degree
of affinity that must be demonstrated in the two types of cases. In unit
determination cases, employees must share a simple community of interest,
but for an accretion, the movant must show the existence of an
overwhelming community of interest.
This added scrutiny in accretion cases is deemed necessary to
effectuate the purposes of the Act. If parties seeking accretions only had to
show a "community of interest" between co-employees, they would almost
never fall, as the Fourth Circuit has observed:
Certainly, there is a "community of interest" in the limited sense
that... employees are paid by the same employer, work in generally the
same geographical area, and exert their efforts to serve the interests of their
employer. However, consideration of only these factors in determining the
necessary "overwhelming community of interest" required for accretion
would mean that every employee, from the president to the janitor, would
41. NLRB v. Am. Seaway Foods, Inc., 702 F.2d 630, 633 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)
("[T]he rate of interchange between office and plant clericals is low."); Kaynard v. Mego
Corp., 633 F.2d 1026, 1030 (2d Cir. 1980)(explaining that the factors used by the Board to
determine whether an accretion is legitimate are usually the same as those employed in
determining the appropriateness of proposed bargaining units in representation
proceedings).
42. NLRB v. Illinois-American Water Co., 933 F.2d 1368, 1377 (7th Cir. 1991); Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 759 F.2d 1477, 1482 (9th Cir. 1985)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
43. "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States" to maintain the free flow
of commerce "by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, selforganization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing .... " 29 U.S.C. §
151 (1992). That may be the statute's stated goal, but as everybody knows, the legislature
and executive can have many unstated reasons for its enactments. One unstated goal of the
Roosevelt Administration was the imposition of unions on even small enterprises, and the
NLRA was a step in that direction. See ARKES, supra note 13.
44. A purported accretion is assessed on the facts that existed at the time the union
made a demand for recognition, not at the time the ALJ or Board hears the case. Gould,
Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 442, 446 (1982).
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fit into a category deserving of accretion. Certainly, the case law looks to
more than these factors in determining the extent of the community of
interest.45
Unlike a straight unit determination case, the accreted employees will
be denied their statutory right to vote for or against a union.46 Thus, the
Board must make sure that the accreted employees and the unit employees
are substantially similar in all respects material to collective bargaining and
union representation. "In accretion cases ...new employees are added to
an existing bargaining unit without a representation election; therefore, the
showing of shared characteristics must be higher to protect employee
interests.' 47 Absent such protection, the accreted employees might end up
being represented by a union whose priorities differ substantially from their
own.
The primary difference between accretion and unit determination
analyses is one of degree rather than kind. Accretion requires an
overwhelming community of interests between a smaller group of
employees and a larger unit, because accretion casts the smaller group,
against its will, into the larger unit. Accretion therefore applies only if one
group of employees has no identity distinct from the other. Unit
determination, by contrast, requires only a substantial community48 of
interests among a group of employees to support casting them as a unit.
To successfully gauge mutual interests, the community of interest test
is a multi-factored one, with some factors receiving greater weight than
others.49 The number of factors used also differs from case to case and
from circuit to circuit, particularly because some factors encompass others,
or have only minor differences. Fourteen factors are discussed here. They
include: (1) the functional integration of the business; (2) centralization of
administrative and managerial control; (3) centralization of supervision,
particularly as to labor relations, hiring, discipline, and control of day-today operations; (4) similarity of compensation and working conditions; (5)
the degree of interchange among and contact between the two groups; (6)
the geographic proximity of the original unit and the site to be accreted; (7)
similarity of job classifications, skills, functions, and products; (8) the size
45. Westvaco, Va., Folding Box Div. v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 1171, 1178 (4th Cir. 1986).
46. Illinois-American Water Co., 933 F.2d at 1377 ("To a certain extent, an accretion
interferes with the employees' freedom to choose their own bargaining agents.") (internal
quotations omitted).
47. NLRB v. Lundy Packing Co., 68 F.3d 1577, 1581 (4th Cir. 1995).
48. Staten Island Univ. Hosp. v. NLRB, 24 F.3d 450, 455 (2d Cir. 1994); see IllinoisAmerican Water Co., 933 F.2d at 1377 ("We note that the Board's decision of accretion is
comparable to a determination of an appropriate bargaining unit.").
49. Nightingale Oil Co. v. NLRB, 905 F.2d 528, 535 (1st Cir. 1990) ("the weight
assigned by the agency to each factor it has fairly considered is a matter for it to
determine")(quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951)).
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of the group to be accreted relative to the size of the existing unit; (9)
whether the group of employees to be accreted independently constitutes an
appropriate unit; (10) prior accretions to the existing unit, and their size and
frequency; (11) the desires of the employees to be accreted; (12) the
collective bargaining history of the groups; (13) the extent of union
organization in the group to be accreted; and (14) whether the group to be
accreted existed at the time the existing bargaining unit was recognized,
and was excluded from the unit.' ° Each factor is discussed below, with an
emphasis placed on the manipulability of the community of interest
balancing test.
1.

Functional Integration of the Business

Among the factors the Board considers is whether there is functional
integration of the new employees and the existing unit; that is, whether the
work done by the group is dependent upon or closely related to the product
or services of the preexisting unit. 51 Little or no functional integration
between two sites suggest that accretion is inappropriate. 2 Thus, where
two groups make completely unrelated products, their functions are not
integrated and, under this factor, these groups are not well-suited for an
accretion. In contrast, employees that work on different components of the
same product, even though they have different jobs and skills, are
considered to be better suited for assimilation. This is partly due to the fact
that a successful strike by one group would necessarily affect the other.
Therefore, their economic interests are significantly intertwined, or at least
do not overtly conflict.
An example of functional integration can be found in Safeway Stores,
Inc.," where the ALJ found that the store's bakery and delicatessen
departments were functionally integrated because the deli department's5 4
products were made with materials produced in the bakery department.
Or, to put it in technical terms, sandwiches were made with bread baked in
the bakery, and the bakery was also the point of origin of the pastries and
50. See generally THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25; ROBERT A. GORMAN,
BASic TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 69 (1976).

51. Under a consideration of functional integration, the Board considers how the work
of each employee blends in with the overall work of the proposed unit. GOLDER, LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW: COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION § 2:7, p. 2-18 (1999). Some courts
ask whether there is physical, functional, and administrative integration of the units. JOSEPH
A. JENKINS, LABOR LAW, § 3.62 (1968) (posing this question as a single factor in the
community of interest matrix).
52. Progressive Serv. Die Co., 323 N.L.R.B. 183 (1997) (explaining that among the
questions the Board will ask to determine functional integration is whether one facility
could be operated without the existence of the other).
53. Safeway Stores, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 918 (1981).
54. Id. at 926.
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other snacks displayed in the deli department.55 Another example of
functionally integrated workers are those who work on the same assembly
line.56 Workers on the end of the line are dependent on workers at the
beginning for material on which to work, while the workers at the
beginning of the assembly line will have little utility to the employer if
there are no workers manning the latter portions of the line. Because a
significant work slowdown or stoppage (perhaps due to a strike) along any
point of the assembly line will affect all workers on the line, assembly-line
workers are usually considered to share a strong community of interest.
2.

Centralization of Administrative and Managerial Control

The Board also considers whether the administrative and managerial
control is centralized or local.5 7 "Centralized administration favors an
employer-wide unit.",58 Where employees are controlled by the same
administrators, they often face similar treatment from supervisors, and
similar working conditions. They are also likely to be subject to the same
hiring, termination, and disciplinary policies. Thus, this factor overlaps
with at least two others in the community of interest test: "similarity of
working conditions" and "centralized supervision."
Consideration of this factor is in part a concession to the needs of
employers. By apportioning units according to the natural divisions a
company has set up, it makes the employer's tasks related to unionization
(such as bargaining and implementing the dues checkoff) much simpler.
Yet this is simply one factor in the analysis, and other factors may (and
frequently do) outweigh it.
3.

Centralization of Supervision, Particularly as to Labor Relations,
Hiring, Discipline, and Control of Day-to-Day Operations

Like the centralized administration factor just discussed, the presence
of common supervisors strongly suggests that accretion might be
appropriate,59 particularly where supervisors have the authority to hire and
fire employees. 60 Conversely, "site-specific supervision favors separate
units.",6'

For example, in Local 620 v. NLRB, 6 2 both the Board and the

55. Id. at 926.
56. Cf Cont'l Web Press Inc. v. NLRB, 742 F.2d 1087, 1091 (7th Cir. 1984) ("It is as if
the Board had said that the workers at the beginning of an assembly line belong in a
different bargaining unit from the ones at the end .....
57. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25.
58. Staten Island Univ. Hosp. v. NLRB, 24 F.3d 450, 455 (2d Cir. 1994).
59. GOLDER, supra note 51.
60. NLRB v. Stevens Ford, Inc., 773 F.2d 468,475 (2d Cir. 1985).
61. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 24 F.3d at 455.
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Court of Appeals held that no accretion had occurred where, among other
things, each site "has its own plant superintendent and industrial relations
director and does its own hiring, handles its own payroll and administers its
own grievance procedures. 6 3
The lack of common supervision militates against an accretion
because "the day-to-day problems and concerns among the employees at
one location may not necessarily be shared by employees who are
separately supervised at another." 64 Different supervisors frequently
exercise their discretion differently, 65 especially as to those decisions that
most concern employees. Where employees have common supervisors
they are more likely to have common concerns, particularly with respect to
terms and conditions of employment. 66 Conversely, where employees
answer to different supervisors, they have much less in common, and may
not share interests with respect to their common employer. For example,
where one group of employees answers to an ogre, they may need to stand
together and form a union or face adverse employment consequences. But
where their counterparts are supervised by a different, more compassionate
supervisor, they may feel less affinity for their suffering colleagues and
may be less willing to shake things up by joining a union or a strike.
This factor weighs even more strongly in favor of accretion if the
supervisors play a part in the labor relations and collective bargaining. 67
This is in part a concession to management, so that it is not burdened with
too many units, each of which could conceivably require a separate
bargaining agreement.68 It also serves the union's interests, however, as
62. Local 620 v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1967).
63. Id. at 709.
64. Stevens Ford, Inc., 773 F.2d at 475
65. Cf. Radue v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 615 (7th Cir. 2000) (ADEA)
("different supervisors may exercise their discretion differently"); Stanback v. Best
Diversified Products, Inc., 180 F.3d 903, 910 (8th Cir. 1999) (Title VI) (explaining that
when "different decision-makers are involved, two decisions are rarely similarly situated in
all relevant respects").

66. Not surprisingly, then, the questions of common supervision and the commonality
of the respective employees' terms and conditions of employment is sometimes stated as a
single factor in the analysis. See JENKINS, supra note 51 (explaining the Board considers
similar "terms and conditions of employment and common supervision.").
67. NLRB v. Illinois-American Water Co., 933 F.2d 1368, 1376 (7th Cir. 1991).
68. This is particularly the case where each unit is represented by a different union. As
Judge Posner noted:

It is costly for an employer to have to negotiate separately with a number of
different unions, and the costs are not borne by the employer alone. The
different unions may have inconsistent goals, yet any one of the unions may be
able to shut down the plant (or curtail its operations) by a strike, thus imposing
costs on other workers as well as on the employer's shareholders, creditors,
suppliers, and customers.
Cont'l Web Press, Inc. v. NLRB, 742 F.2d 1087, 1090 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.).
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unions similarly have limited resources. Where they can minimize the
number of separate units, and maximize the number of employees in each
unit, they can minimize the expenditures for collective bargaining and
spread those costs over a greater body. Larger units also mean more power
for the union, as the more employees the union can commandeer in a strike,
the more the employer is at the union's mercy in the event an impasse is
reached.
4.

Similarity of Compensation and Working Conditions

A basic principle of the accretion doctrine is that only employees with
strong common interests should be joined in the same unit, lest a conflict of
interest arise or the group disintegrates into powerless fragments. 69 "The
greatest conflicts of interest among workers are over wages, fringe benefits,
and working conditions., 70
Therefore, the similarity between the
compensation and working conditions of the unit to be accreted and the
established unit is highly relevant and a particularly important factor in the
accretion analysis. 71 Indeed, the "primary concern or 'touchstone' of a
bargaining unit determination is the question of whether all the members
have a mutual 72interest in wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment.
Dissimilarities in compensation and working conditions strongly
suggest a lack of significant mutual interest and cut against the propriety of
an accretion. Where the employees who seek to be consolidated have
excellent working conditions, they may have little in common with the
established unit, and may have even less interest in joining such a group.
Conversely, approximate parity of working conditions weighs strongly in
favor of shared interests and the suitability of an accretion. However,
because employers often have the ability to manipulate similarities and
differences between wages and working conditions in order to thwart or
promote an accretion, the courts will discount any such orchestrated

69. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am. v. Pitt. Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 17273 (1971) ("[A] mutuality of interest serves to assure the coherence among employees
necessary for efficient collective bargaining and at the same time to prevent a functionally
distinct minority group of employees from being submerged in an overly large unit.");
FLORIAN BARTOSIC & ROGER C. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR

§ 7.03(c)(1), p. 153 (2d ed. 1986) ("[T]he Board seeks sufficient homogeneity regarding a
group's employment relationship to minimize internal conflicts impairing the unit's
bargaining effectiveness.").
70. Cont'l Web Press, Inc., 742 F.2d at 1091.
71. GOLDER, supra note 51; THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25; BARTOSIC,

supra note 69.
72. NLRB v. Catherine McCauley Health Ctr., 885 F.2d 341, 345 (6th Cir. 1989)
(citing Uyeda v. Brooks, 365 F.2d 329 (6th Cir. 1966)).
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conditions accordingly.73
Where the employees to be accreted suffer inferior working
conditions, joining a unit with better conditions might present the accreted
group with a substantial advantage, as they might be reaping the benefits
that their counterparts previously achieved through hard bargaining.
Although a windfall for the new arrivals, this may not be in the best
interests of the established unit, as the equalization of working conditions
may require the expenditure of employer wealth that otherwise would have
inured to the benefit of the established unit's employees. Similarly, the
unit's valuable bargaining leverage might be squandered on simply
improving the working conditions of the new members, at the expense of
the original members' overall interests. Furthermore, unit employees might
74
resent the new arrivals for reaping a harvest they did not sow. Absent a
substantial dose of munificence, the accretion might create a disharmony
that could destroy the union by pitting unit members against each other.
Accordingly, significant differences in working conditions can lead the
Board to conclude that the two groups lack an overwhelming community of
interest.75
Thus held the Board and the Sixth Circuit in Armco, Inc. v. NLRB,76
where the employer attempted to accrete coke workers from a newly
acquired plant into a preexisting unit of steelworkers. 7 In concurring with
the Board that no accretion occurred, the Sixth Circuit noted that coke
workers "work in a more hazardous environment than most steel
workers., 78 "[T]he carcinogenic conditions existing in the coke plant are a
constant hazard to the coke workers, and, therefore, constitute a legitimate
ground for separate bargaining., 79 The malleability of this factor, however,
was displayed in Staten Island University Hospital v. NLRB,8 ° where the
unionized and non-union nurses received the identical wages for the same
Nevertheless, the Board held that the employment
type of work."
conditions were significantly different simply because the unionized nurses
enjoyed seniority and benefits packages superior to those of their non-

73. Armco Inc. v. NLRB, 832 F.2d 357, 364 (6th Cir. 1987) ("the uniformity in wages,
hours, and terms of employment is the result of the disputed conduct: the application of the
Steelworkers' contract to the coke plant employees").
74. As de Tocqueville observed, self interest is "the only immutable point in the human
heart." I ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 255 (Francis Bowen, ed.,
Vintage Books, 1958).
75. NLRB v. Stevens Ford, Inc., 773 F.2d 468, 475 (2d Cir. 1985).
76. Arnco Inc., 832 F.2d at 357.
77. Id. at 363.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Staten Island Univ. Hosp. v. NLRB, 24 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 1994).
81. Id. at 455 (denying review of the Board's finding of no accretion).
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union comrades.82
Among the conditions that the courts consider under this factor are the
methods employers use to fix compensation (e.g., hourly wage,
commission, or salary), the pay scale,83 the similarity of pension and
retirement plans available to each group, 84 and whether employees receive
stock options or have the ability to participate in a stock ownership plan.85
Also relevant are the disability, medical, and retirement benefits, 6 hours of
work, working conditions, vacation periods, and other terms and
conditions of employment. 90 Demonstrating that no punctilio is too
insignificant when the Board and courts are looking for grounds to support
their accretion decisions, one court considered the fact that certain
employees were prohibited from utilizing certain ingresses and egresses at
the employer's plant, while their counterparts enjoyed full use of all exits
and entrances. 91 Not to be outdone, another court considered whether the
two groups of employees used the same lunch room or, shudder, ate
separately. 9' Although these actors may have played only a small part in
the courts' decisions, were hardly all of the considerations, under the
overwhelming community of interest balancing test, nothing is too trivial to
place on the scale, as even one ounce can appreciably alter the balance.

82. Id.
83. Auto. Club of Mich. v. NLRB, 631 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1980).
84. Westvaco, Va., Folding Box Div. v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 1171, 1176 (4th Cir. 1986).
85. Id.; Stevens Ford,Inc., 773 F.2d at 475.
86. Westvaco, Va., Folding Box Div. 795 F.2d at 1176.
87. Mercy Hosp. of Buffalo v. NLRB, 730 F.2d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1984).
88. NLRB v. J.W. Rex Co., 243 F.2d 356, 360 (3d Cir. 1957) (finding that the Board
did not abuse its discretion in recognizing an accretion).
89. Westvaco, Va., Folding Box Div., 795 F.2d at 1175.
90. NLRB v. Lundy Packing Co., 68 F.3d 1577, 1580 (4th Cir. 1995). A good, though
underinclusive, rule of thumb is that any factor that is relevant to an adverse employment
action under Title VII merits consideration as a term or condition of employment. Thus, it
is relevant to the accretion analysis whether the two groups of employees share the same
standards for demotion, Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 F.2d 132, 136
(7th Cir. 1993); are evaluated according to similar standards and procedures, Brooks v. City
of San Mateo, 214 F.3d 1082, 1094 (9th Cir. 2000); and share similar levels of
responsibility, Galabya v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 641 (2d Cir. 2000),
since an employer can commit an adverse employment action by discriminating on a
prohibited basis with respect to any of these factors.
91. Westvaco, Va., Folding Box Div. 795 F.2d at 1176 ("[Tlhe utilities technicians may
use any door in the plant when coming to or leaving work, unlike the production and
maintenance employees who are required to use a specified door. Utilities technicians may
take their breaks and meal periods anywhere in the plant, while the members of the
bargaining unit are required to take their breaks and meal periods in the plant cafeteria.").
92. Id.; Mercy Hosp. of Buffalo, 730 F.2d at 82; NLRB v. Am. Seaway Foods, Inc., 702
F.2d 630, 633 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). This facet of working conditions is also relevant
to the next factor, which considers the amount of contact between employees of the
respective groups.
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5.

The Degree of Employee Interchange and Contact Among the
Groups

The Board also considers the frequency of contact and interchange
among employees to be one of the most important factors in the accretion
analysis. 93 In considering this subject, the Board looks for routine
interchange and meaningful contact between a large percentage of
employees from the preexisting group and the group to be accreted.94 Thus,
a complete "lack of employee interchange between plants militates against
a finding of functional integration. '95 Occasional, temporary, and sporadic
movements among small groups usually does not suggest a strong
community of interest, and in fact, some courts also consider sporadic and
infrequent interchange to be a mark against accretion.96
The relevance of this sporadic contact was demonstrated in Pacific
Southwest Airlines v. NLRB,97 where a few clerical employees on the
margin of the unit occasionally telephoned production workers as part of
their job. The Ninth Circuit held that this interchange was too narrow and
superficial to support an accretion. 98 Similarly, where ten workers
transferred to another plant for only a month, and there was no other
interchange, the Board and the Sixth Circuit believed that this was
insufficient contact to support an accretion.99 In Armco Inc. v. NLRB,1°° the
Sixth Circuit held that this factor militated against finding an accretion of
coke workers into a preexisting unit of steelworkers where "out of 2700
steelworkers, only 24 maintenance employees have any contact with the
coke workers. Such a small, one-way exchange fails" to support an
accretion.''
The court also considered it relevant that the hazardous
conditions in the coke plant02would discourage steel plant workers to seek a

transfer to coke plant jobs. 1

In one case involving affiliated health care facilities, where employees
from one facility assisted at another hospital when business demanded, the
Second Circuit agreed with the Board that this did not support an
accretion. 103 In another case where registered nurses could voluntarily
93. Lundy Packing Co., 68 F.3d at 1580; NLRB v. Catherine McCauley Health Ctr.,
885 F.2d 341, 345 (6th Cir. 1989); Am. Seaway Foods, Inc., 702 F.2d at 633 (per curiam);
GOLDER, supra note

51;

BARTOSIC, supra note 69.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

JENKINS, supra note 51.

101.

Id.

Armco Inc., 832 F.2d at 363.
Pac.Southwest Airlines, 587 F.2d at 1042.
Id.
Id. at 1042-43.
Local 620 v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 707, 709 (6th Cir. 1967).
Armco Inc. v. NLRB, 832 F.2d 357, 363 (6th Cir. 1987).

102. Id.
103. NLRB v. Heartshare Human Servs., Inc., 108 F.3d 467, 471 (2d Cir. 1997).
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transfer between two sites, the Board likewise held that no accretion
occurred, particularly where such transfers were discouraged by
management.°4
In short, the more integrated the units and the greater the contact
among blocks of employees, the greater their community of interest. But
because this factor, like all the other factors, is emphasized or ignored
depending on other relevant facts and the proclivities of the Board, in some
10 5
cases even a low level of steady interchange may support an accretion.
For example, in NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,' °6 the Second Circuit
held that an accretion was proper even though employee interchange was
minimal. The case involved a beverage distributor who initially operated
out of a warehouse in Tonawanda, New York, but later spun-off part of his
operations to a second location twenty-one miles away in Orchard Park,
New York. The only interchange among employees involved a single
employee punching a time clock at the Tonawanda warehouse before
delivering material to the Orchard Park site, his primary duty station.
Realizing that this was particularly minimal interchange, the Court stressed
that the Orchard Park site had only three or four employees at this time, and
many other factors strongly militated in favor of an accretion. In such a
case, the court held that "even a low level of interchange may have
significance."' 0

7

Hiring procedures and preferences are also considered under this
factor. Thus, if employees can leave one group and join the other without
having to apply for the position, or if they receive a preference in hiring,
this suggests a certain continuity among the two entities. °8 On the other
hand, a complete lack of employee interchange between groups, and the
need to follow application procedures to change jobs, militates against
joining employees from different work sites.'0 9 Cases falling in the
wasteland between complete autonomy and constant interchange can go
either way. Consider, for example, NLRB v. Heartshare Human Services,
104. Staten Island Univ. Hosp. v.NLRB, 24 F.3d 450, 453 (2d Cir. 1994).
105. See NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 191 F.3d 316, 323 (2d Cir. 1999); NLRB v.
Carson Cable TV, 795 F.2d 879, 885 (9th Cir. 1986).
106. Coca-ColaBottling Co., 191 F.3d at 323.
107. Id.
108. See HeartshareHuman Servs., Inc., 108 F.3d at 471 (confirming that the absence of
a formal application process can imply continuity).
109. See Id. at 471 (indicating that the requirement of formal procedures in a job-shifting

situation is evidence of insufficient employee interchange); NLRB v. Stevens Ford, Inc.,
773 F.2d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1985) (suggesting that there are limits to the accretion doctrine);
Town Ford Sales, 262 N.L.R.B. 1331, 1334 (1982) (expressing that a certain amount of
employee interchange is necessary to join employees from different work sites);
Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 909, 912 (1972) (reaffirming that employees in new
jobs should not be added to an existing bargaining unit if there is a complete lack of
employee interchange).
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Inc., ° a unit determination case involving the organization of workers at a
private social service organization that assisted developmentally disabled
adults. Consistent with the typical union strategy of starting small, the
union sought a bargaining unit consisting of only one site, even though the
employer operated two other similar facilities within ten miles of one
another. The Second Circuit agreed with the Board that, for various
reasons, the single-site unit was appropriate. In considering the minimal
employee interchange, the court explained:
The employee interchange factor supports the NLRB's decision. Each
facility has its own staff and there is no routine interchange of employees
among the three sites. Not surprisingly, if one facility becomes particularly
busy, an employee from another center may lend a hand, but usually only
for a day or two. This is the exception not the rule. Additionally, if there is
a job opening at one facility, employees from another facility may apply,
however, they are required to follow the same procedures as nonHeartshare applicants. Selections are based on merit, and employees from
related facilities are given no preference, unless all else is equal."1 '
Accordingly, the court agreed with the Board that this and other
factors supported the union's position that the various sites should be kept
separate for the purpose of the initial representation election. The court so
held even though there was more employee interchange at the Heartshare
facilities than at the Buffalo Coca-Cola warehouses where the court found
an accretion. One key difference was that the employer in Heartshare
wanted a unit consisting of all three facilities, while the employer in CocaCola Bottling Co. opposed the accretion. In each case the Board did
exactly what the union wanted: a single-facility unit in Heartshare and an
accretion in Coca-Cola. This demonstrates, yet again, the manipulability
of the community of interest balancing test and its use to assist unions at
the expense of employers and possibly their employees.
6.

Geographic Proximity

The physical distance between the preexisting unit and the group to be
accreted is also considered by the Board. 1 2 This factor is closely related to
the degree of interchangeability; employees are considered much more
interchangeable if their worksites are relatively proximate. The court
considers this to be a facet of employee or functional interchange. Because
110. HeartshareHuman Servs.. Inc., 108 F.3d at 471.

111. Id.
112. See NLRB v. Lundy Packing Co., 68 F.3d 1577, 1580 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that
physical distance is a consideration when deciding whether accretion is appropriate);
GOLDER, supra note 51; THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25, at 405; JENKINS,
supra note 51.
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the Board does not even discuss this factor in many of its accretion
decisions, it is reasonable to believe that geographic proximity is
considered irrelevant to many cases. Indeed, this factor has proven to be
noteworthy only in the extremes: close proximity, which suggests the
appropriateness of an accretion, and extreme remoteness, a factor militating
against accretion. Even in these extreme cases, however, this factor often
bears little weight and is seldom, if ever, decisive. For example, in NLRB
v. Stevens Ford, Inc., where two commonly owned car dealerships were
directly adjacentto one another, the Second Circuit refused to enforce the
Board's accretion order on its own analysis of the other community of
interest factors." 3 Although both the Board and the Second Circuit seemed
to agree that this proximity favored accretion, the Court of Appeals
obviously found other factors more compelling.
With respect to the consideration of geographic proximity, the Stevens
Ford case is hardly an aberration. Both the Board and the Court of Appeals
have denied accretions in cases where the two sites were directly adjacent
to each other in the same plant, 14 where they were across the street from
each other," 5 were three miles apart, 1 6 five to ten miles apart," 7 eight miles

apart on the same island, " ' ten miles apart,' 9 twenty-one miles apart, 12 and
121 Yet in another case, St. Regis Paper Co.,122
forty-five to fifty miles apart.
where the union sought the accretion, the Board acquiesced even though
the sites were seventy-five miles apart. Of course, because distance
between sites is simply one among many factors the Board considers, and
because this factor has no fixed weight, St. Regis PaperCo. essentially has
little or no precedential value as to geographic distance and accretions.
113. NLRB v. Stevens Ford, Inc., 773 F.2d 468, 475 (2d Cir. 1985). In particular, the
Second Circuit focused on different working conditions, different supervisors, lack of
functional integration, lack of interchange among employees, the facts that the group was
itself an appropriate unit, that they were previously excluded from the unit, and that the
employees expressed disapproval of the union that would represent them if they were
accreted.
114. Gould, Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 442, 442 (1982).
115. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 759 F.2d 1477, 1480
(9th Cir. 1985).
116. Local 144, Hotel, Hosp., Nursing Home & Allied Servs Unison v. NLRB, 9 F.3d
218, 220 (2d Cir. 1993).
117. NLRB v. Heartshare Human Servs., Inc., 108 F.3d 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1997).
118. Staten Island Univ. Hosp. v. NLRB, 24 F.3d 450, 452 (2d Cir. 1994).
119. Kaynard v. Mego Corp., 633 F.2d 1026, 1028 (2d Cir. 1980).
120. NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 191 F.3d 316, 319 (2d Cir. 1999). The Third
Circuit has said that a twenty-mile separation between plants is "a strong factor" in the
accretion analysis. NLRB v. Security-Columbian Banknote Co., 541 F.2d 135, 141 (3d Cir.
1976).
121. Local 620, Allied Indus. Workers of Am. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 707, 708 (6th Cir.
1967).
122. NLRB v. St. Regis Paper Co., 674 F.2d 104, 106 (1st Cir. 1982).
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Perhaps the extreme distance should have been given greater weight by the
Board, or perhaps even then it would have been overcome by the combined
mass of the other community of interest factors. Perhaps the case turned on
the fact that the employees were mechanics who traveled extensively to
various logging sites anyway.123 Maybe the Board considered geographic
distance to be a strong factor, but because the case involved the forests of
Maine, where seventy-five miles might be, from a relative perspective,
considered close, this factor actually favors an accretion. 12 4 Cases like St.
Regis Paper Co. show, yet again, the difficulty of predicting which factors
the Board will consider important, and thus how it will decide even a
"simple" accretion case.
7.

Similarity of Job Classifications, Skills, Training, Functions, and
Products

One of the most important factors in the balancing test is the similarity
of job classifications, employment skills, training, the functions of
employees, and the similarity of the services they perform or the type of
goods they produce. 12 These are important because employees who have
similar jobs and skills generally have common interests with respect to
their employers, particularly where they produce the same type of goods or
provide similar services. These factors are also relevant to working
conditions, as general working conditions are often identical among plants
in the same industry and among specific occupations in those industries.
For example, the heat and safety concerns involved with blast furnaces are
generally common to the steel industry, regardless of whether an employee
is in an accretable group or an established unit. The similarity of skill,
education, and function also suggests common interests in that these
employees will share a common benefit if they can organize substantially
all of their prospective competitors in the labor market. If this occurs, the
union members need not worry about being undercut by similarly skilled
workers in non-union plants.
But even this factor, which the Ninth Circuit calls the "most reliable
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. NLRB v. Lundy Packing Co., 68 F.3d 1577, 1580 (4th Cir. 1995); Westvaco, Va.,
Folding Box Div. v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 1171, 1173-74 (4th Cir. 1986). As the Ninth Circuit
has observed: "The most reliable indicium of common interests among employees is
similarity in their skills, duties, and working conditions." Pac. Southwest Airlines v. r4LRB,
587 F.2d 1032, 1042 (9th Cir. 1978). See GOLDER, supra note 51, (indicating that
similarities between work places are crucial factors); BARTOSIC, supra note 69, § 7.03(c)(1),
at 153 (citing factors that have a "direct relevancy to the circumstances within which
collective bargaining is to take place."); JENKINS, supra note 51 (listing specific factors that
must be considered in accretion situations).
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indicium of common interests among employees,"' 126 provides no bright
lines. Thus, in light of the Ninth Circuit's endorsement of this factor, one
might suppose, conversely, that employees with unique job skills and
functions which differ substantially from their co-workers do not share a
sufficient community of interest to warrant an accretion. But this is not
always so. 127 Many employees in a given unit do not have identical skills
and functions, yet they frequently share similar interests vis-ti-vis their
relationship with their common employer. So even when this factor is
emphasized by the Board, complete identity is certainly not required for an
accretion. 12 This raises an interesting question. If this factor, like the
other community of interest factors discussed thus far, is considered,
ignored, or slighted by the Board according to no discernable standard or
rule, why even bother with the community of interest balancing test?
Instead of paternalistically forcing employees to associate with those whose
interests may or may not be consistent with their own, why not instead, let
the parties in the best position to judge their interests (the employees)
decide whether their interests sufficiently coalesce with those of the
preexisting unit to warrant an accretion? 129 This proposition is discussed
more fully below, but it is worthwhile to keep it in mind as the next seven
community of interests factors are considered.

126. Pac. Southwest Airlines, 587 F.2d at 1042.
127. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co., 319 N.L.R.B. 607, at 607 (1995) (stating that
maintenance agreement sales employees were sufficiently similar to service technicians,
technician helpers, installers, support specialists, and truck mechanics).
128. Id.
129. Of course, Congress gave the Board the responsibility of determining appropriate
bargaining units, but nothing in the NLRA prevents the Board from allowing employees to
decide accretion decisions in the first instance through a secret ballot vote, with the Board
simply overseeing those decisions to ensure that no aberrations occur (assuming, arguendo,
that a statement of the employee's desires as to whether they want to associate with the
established unit could ever be an aberration). Indeed, the Board is authorized to make unit
determination decisions so as to "ensure the employees the fullest freedom in exercising
their rights guaranteed by this Act." 29 U.S.C. § 159(b). One of those rights is the right to
freely associate, or not, with other employees, and to be represented by unions (or not) of
their own choice. 29 U.S.C. § 151,
5. In the First Amendment context, policies that
infringe communicative and associative interests to serve paternalistic purposes are viewed
with skepticism. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 798 (1983) (explaining that a law
which restricts the flow of information primarily to serve paternalistic interests "must be
viewed with some skepticism"); Krislov v. Rednour, 226 F.3d 851, at 852 (7th Cir. 2000)
("[T]fiere is no per se bar to paternalistic laws, but they are highly suspect when they also
burden speech."); Cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. R. I., 517 U.S. 484, 507 (1996) (expressing that
the state cannot prohibit commercial speech in an effort to serve paternalistic purposes
where the chosen means has not been shown to serve the state's goal). Likewise, the
Board's paternalistic practice of forcing employees to associate through an accretion should
be viewed with added scrutiny.
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The Size of the Group to be Accreted Relative to the Size of the
Existing Unit

The Board and the courts also consider the size of the unit to be
accreted relative to the magnitude of the established unit, as the added
group could jeopardize the majority status of the existing union. 3 ° "[T]he
larger the size of the accreted group relative to the unit, the more doubt
there is as to the wishes of the employees in the enlarged unit." '' As the
Second Circuit has explained it:
When a new group of employees is added en masse to an existing
unit without an election... there is no reason to presume the
bargaining representative's majority status among the new group,
and the logical strength of the presumption of a continuing
majority in the unit as a whole is weakened. Where the accreted
group is small relative to the unit, the danger of the accretion
resulting in overall minority status is minimal. Where the size of
the accreted group is relatively large, however, the danger of
minority status in the enlarged unit is greater. The need to
determine the views of the group to be accreted thus varies
directly with its size relative to the existing group. 132
As this excerpt demonstrates, consideration of this factor is primarily
designed to protect employees of the preexisting unit and the incumbent
union, and to a lesser extent, the captive employees whom the Board
paternalistically forced into the accretion. It prevents two related scenarios:
(1) accretion of so many employees opposed to the union that the union
will lose its majority status and might eventually be voted out; and (2)
accretion of so many employees opposed to the union that a new majority
is created, which is forced to put up with unwanted union representation
until a decertification election can be held. As to the first concern, some
circuits consider the loss of the union's majority support separate from the
community of interest test. These courts will bar an accretion any time an

130. Local 144, Hotel, Hosp/, Nursing Home & Allied Servs. Unison v. NLRB, 9 F.3d
218, 223 (2d Cir. 1993) (affirming that the sizes of the group to be accreted and the existing
group are relevant factors); NLRB v. Stevens Ford, Inc., 773 F.2d 468, 473 (2d Cir.
1985)(noting that relative group sizes affect the ability to measure employee wishes);
Universal Sec. Instruments, Inc. v. NLRB, 649 F.2d at 255 (4th Cir. 1981) (suggesting that
accreted groups that are much larger than existing groups could be problematic); Local No.
3-193 Int'l Woodworkers v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 611 F.2d 1295, 1299-1300 (9th Cir. 1980)
(reiterating that the majority status of the existing group could be jeopardized by a larger
accreted group); Spartan Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 1002, 1005 (5th Cir. 1969)
(discussing the implications of accreted groups that are larger than existing groups).
131. Stevens Ford., Inc., 773 F.2d at 474.
132. Id.
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existing union's majority support will be overcome by an accretion,
regardless of the other community of interest factors.1 33
This is
understandable, as one goal the Board must keep in mind in making unit
determination decisions is the stabilization of labor-management
relations,134 and the destruction of a union's majority status is assumed to
be contrary to this goal. 3 ' The second scenario also concerns fundamental
policies of the NLRA: the freedom of employees to select the bargaining
agent of their choice or no representative at all. This right of selfdetermination ostensibly receives consideration in another "community of

interest" factor: the views of the employees to be accreted.1 36 So whether
considered as a separate bar or as another factor in the "community of
interest" test, these considerations are highly relevant to the accretion
analysis, and are sufficiently substantial to preclude an accretion.
9.

Whether the Group of Employees to be Accreted Independently
Constitutes an Appropriate Unit

Another relevant factor is whether the group of employees to be
accreted has a separate and discernable identity such that it could constitute
its own appropriate unit.117 The Board has described its treatment of this
factor: "[T]he Board has found an accretion only when the additional
employees have little or no separate group identity and thus cannot be
considered to be a separate appropriate unit."' 3 8 Accordingly, when a
group could be its own appropriate unit, this, in itself, precludes a forced
accretion.'" The reasoning behind this practice has some plausibility, as
133. Cent. Soya Co. v. NLRB, 867 F.2d 1245, 1248 (10th Cir. 1989) ("Once the Board
has concluded that the above factors favor the accretion of the former Cooper employees,
the sole question is whether, when these employees are added, the majority status of the
bargaining representative is cast into doubt.").
134. NLRB v. Illinois-American Water Co., 933 F.2d 1368, 1375 (7th Cir. 1991).
135. In the short term, this assumption is probably correct. But a new union, or even a
decision by the employees not to be represented by a union at all, might, in the long run, be
more conducive to stable labor-management relations.
136. The employees' views may be ascertained, before accretion by examining
authorization cards. Kaynard v. Mego Corp., 633 F.2d 1026, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980).
137. Local 144, Hotel, Hosp., Nursing Home & Allied Servs. Unison v. NLRB, 9 F.3d
218, 223 (2d Cir. 1993); Westvaco, Va., Folding Box Div. v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 1171, 1173
(4th Cir. 1986); Stevens Ford, Inc., 773 F.2d at 473; Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers v. NLRB, 759 F.2d 1477, 1479 (9th Cir. 1985). Of course, a group of employees
could have a separate identity and still not be an independently appropriate unit. But to be
an appropriate unit, the group must have a separate identity. Once a group is an appropriate
unit (and thus has a separate identity negating an accretion) it might later decide to
voluntarily combine with another preexisting unit, thus surrendering elements of its separate
identity.
138. Safeway Stores, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 918, 918 (1981).
139. Conversely, the fact that a group of employees cannot themselves constitute an
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the community of interest test is designed to determine whether the new
employees "have such a close community of interests with the existing unit
that they have no true identity distinct from it."'4 Where substantial
common interest is lacking, there should be no accretion but rather an
election. Conversely, where "the group to be accreted does not constitute
its own appropriate unit," the Second Circuit has held that "the employees
should be accreted so long as accretion does 14not cast into doubt that
majority status of the bargaining representative." 1
Analysis under this factor can lead to a little circularity, however,
because the Board also uses the community of interest factors to determine
whether a group constitutes an appropriate unit. 42 The circularity appears
as follows. When faced with an ostensibly accretable group, the Board
applies the overwhelming community of interest balancing test. One factor
in the overwhelming community of interest test is whether these employees
constitute their own appropriate unit. To make that determination, the
Board applies the community of interest balancing test, one factor of which
is whether the group of employees constitutes its own appropriate unit, and
round and round we go. To avoid this circularity, therefore, some courts do
not even consider this "independent appropriateness" factor as part of the
community of interest test, but rather as a completely separate question that
should be asked only in accretion cases. 143 For them, when a group has a
separate identity and can be its own appropriate unit, there is no need to

appropriate unit is a sufficient, but not a necessary cause for finding an accretion. Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 759 F.2d at 1481. This is so particularly
because the employees might be accretable to another preexisting unit, or should be
permitted to express their own opinion as to whether they favor accretion or
nonrepresentation. Compare with Stevens Ford, Inc., 773 F.2d at 473 (offering that where
the accreted group cannot constitute an independent appropriate unit, "it seems clear that
that group ought to be part of the existing unit for unit determination purposes, and the sole
question is whether, when it is added, the majority status of the bargaining representative is
cast into doubt").
140. NLRB v. St. Regis Paper Co., 674 F.2d 104, 108 (1st Cir. 1982) (emphasis added).
See NLRB v. DMR Corp., 795 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1986); Pac. Southwest Airlines v. NLRB,
587 F.2d 1032, 1041 n.16 (9th Cir. 1978).
141. Local 144, Hotel, Hosp., Nursing Home & Allied Servs. Unison, 9 F.3d at 223 (2d
Cir. 1993). "[T]he Board has traditionally been reluctant to find an accretion even where
the resulting unit would be appropriate, in those cases where a smaller unit, consisting solely
of the accreted unit, would be appropriate and the § 7 rights of the accreted employees
would be better preserved by denying the accretion." Boire v. Bhd. of Teamsters, 479 F.2d
778, 795 (5th Cir. 1973).
142. Notably, the Board's refusal to accrete the employees does "not require any explicit
and unequivocal finding that they constituted a separate unit." Int'l Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, 759 F.2d at 1481. There may be other reasons for not accreting them.
143. Central Soya Co. v. NLRB, 867 F.2d 1245, 1248 (10th Cir. 1989) ("When the new
employees share a 'community of interest' with unit employees and have no separate
identity, they are then properly accreted into the bargaining unit .... ") (emphasis added).
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accrete the group, 144 since the employees can unionize their group of their
own volition. 45 In such a case, these employees can petition for a union
election in their own appropriate unit, and if the same union is elected, it
can seek to combine the two units.
Because of the circularity involved in this factor, it sometimes adds
nothing to the accretion analysis, for in those cases where the group cannot
be its own separate unit (because it lacks a community of interest among its
own members), it will seldom have a sufficient community of interest with
the preexisting unit, thereby precluding an accretion. Thus, if the group
could be a separate appropriate unit it will not be accreted, 146 and if it
cannot be a separate appropriate unit (because it lacks common interests) it
also will not be accreted.
10.

Prior Accretions to the Existing Unit, and their Size and
Frequency

Prior accretions to the existing unit are also considered relevant to the
community of interest analysis, 147 especially where previous large
accretions have occurred, because they call into question the union's
continuing majority support. Furthermore, adding a new group to a unit
that is already considering whether to reject its union might provide the
catalyst that triggers the ousting of the union. Because a union's dismissal
is thought to be contrary to labor-management.. stability,
at least in the short
148
term, the Board will not permit such accretions.
Also, the desirability of
holding an election is thought to increase as the number of employees
denied the right to vote for or against the union increases. Thus, where "a
substantial portion of the unit is the result of prior accretions, further
additions should be allowed only after an election." 4 9 Where a prior,
sizable accretion has already occurred, "a second sizable accretion would
lead to a unit in which the only election held would be virtually irrelevant
144. Stevens Ford, Inc., 773 F.2d at 473 ("[Cjourts have held that accretion may occur
only when the accreted group does not constitute an appropriate unit.").
145. Local 144, Hotel, Hosp., Nursing Home & Allied Servs. Unison, 9 F.3d at 223
("Where the group does constitute a separate bargaining unit, the employees of that unit
have a right to choose whether or not they wish to elect a different bargaining representative
or no representative.").
146. Id, at 223; Central Soya Co., 867 F.2d at 1248; Stevens Ford, Inc., 773 F.2d at 476.
"[I]n recent years the Board has been extremely protective of the employees' free choice in
those situations where the accreted unit could stand on its own." Boire, 479 F.2d at 797.
147. Local 144, Hotel, Hosp., Nursing Home & Allied Servs. Unison, 9 F.3d at 223;
Stevens Ford,Inc., 773 F.2d at 474.
148. As a side note, a vast accretion to the bargaining unit may sometimes persuade the
Board to relieve an employer of its duty to bargain with a union during the certification
year. NLRB v. Lexington Cartage Co., 713 F.2d 190, 192 (6th Cir. 1983).
149. Stevens Ford, Inc., 773 F.2d at 474.
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to the present majority status of the bargaining representative." 50 A failure
to consider prior accretions also could result in a "domino effect" whereby
"the unit expands one group at a time along tangents remote from the unit's
nucleus."''
The amount of time that has elapsed since the occurrence of prior
accretions is also relevant because certain rules preclude an election for a
given period of time (such as a blocking charge,' 52 the certification bar,'53
the contract bar, 54 and the election bar 55). If the requisite time has not yet
elapsed, the unit created by previous accretions has not yet had an
opportunity to vote against the union, or for a competing union. In such
instances there is insufficient evidence that the unit employees still support
the union, since they haven't had a recent opportunity to voice their
opinions. It would therefore be foolish to force even more employees into
this void of voicelessness. This is not a permanent bar to the accretion,
however, and once the unit employees have had a chance to make their
opinions known, the accretion may occur.
11. The Desires of the Employees to be Accreted
Because the employees' right to choose their own bargaining
representative is frequently at issue in accretion cases, 116 the views of the
employees to be accreted are highly relevant. 157 Presumably nobody
understands the interests of the group to be accreted better than the

150. Id. at 476.
151. Pac. Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1978).
152. See Bishop v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 1024, 1028-1029 (5th Cir. 1974). Under the
Board's "blocking charge" policy, the Board will not conduct an election while an unfair
labor practice charge affecting the unit is pending, unless the charging party seeks to lift the
bar.
153. NLRB v. Paper Mfrs. Co., 786 F.2d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 1986) ("For one year after the
date of a Board certification a certified bargaining representative enjoys an irrebuttable
presumption of continuing support from a majority of the employees in the bargaining
unit.").
154. See Cind-R-Lite Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 1255, 1255 (1979). Under the so-called
"contract bar," the execution of a valid collective bargaining agreement will preclude a
union election during the period it is effective for up to three years.
155. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1994) ("No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit
or any subdivision within which in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall
have been held.").
156. NLRB v. Illinois-American Water Co., S. Div., 933 F.2d 1368, 1377 (7th Cir.
1991).
157. NLRB v. Lundy Packing Co., 68 F.3d 1577, 1580 (4th Cir. 1995); Local 144 v.
NLRB, 9 F.3d 218, 223 (2d Cir. 1993); NLRB v. Stevens Ford, Inc., 773 F.2d 468, 474 (2d
Cir. 1985); Sheraton-Kauai Corp. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1970); United
States Food & Commercial Workers, 267 N.L.R.B. 891, 894 (1983); GOLDER, supra note
51; NICHOLAS S. FALCONE, LABOR LAW 236 (1962).
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employees themselves. They are often in the best position to know whether
they share an overwhelming community of interest with the employees of
the preexisting unit. But the Board faces the problem of gauging the
desires of the employees without holding a referendum on the accretion
issue, the most accurate means of assessing employee sentiment. The
Board disfavors accretion elections presumably because it doesn't want to
be bound by the employees' choice, especially if they vote not to join the
unionized unit. After all, it would become readily apparent where the
Board's loyalties lie if it forced an accretion even after the affected
employees voted against this course of action. Not wanting to embarrass
itself in this way, or surrender the power it wields, the Board and the courts
look to other methods of ascertaining employee choice, since these other
methods are more ambiguous than elections and readily lend themselves to
creative interpretations.
Evidence of the employees' preference vis-a-vis an accretion is
sometimes available where competing unions are engaged in organization
efforts,'5"8 or where an informal poll has been taken. The Second Circuit
has looked to a union's support during a strike to gauge its popularity with
employees. "9 Thus, in Stevens Ford,the court considered it significant that
during a strike by the employees of the established unit, nine of the eleven
employees of the accretable group reported for work, suggesting that they
and similarly didn't support it at
did not support the union during the• strike,
160
Likewise, in a fight between two
the time of the purported accretion.
competing unions, the Second Circuit ascertained employee support for the
accretion by considering that one union obtained ten authorization cards
while its competitor obtained fifty.' 6' In stark contrast to these approaches,
the Sixth Circuit explicitly and consistently refuses to consider this factor
in its accretion analysis.162 This is perhaps a testament to the fact that the
employees to be accreted really have no say in the matter, even when their
desires are purportedly considered as one factor in the overwhelming
community of interest balancing test.
12. Collective Bargaining History
When considering an accretion, the Board also ostensibly will
158. NLRB v. Stevens Ford, Inc., 773 F.2d 468, 474 (2d Cir. 1985).
159. Id. at 476.
160. Id.
161. Kaynard v. Mego Corp., 633 F.2d 1026, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980).
162. NLRB v. Catherine McCauley Health Ctr., 885 F.2d 341, 345 (6th Cir. 1989)
("'Employee desires,' an additional factor frequently included in other circuits, is not a
relevant factor in this circuit."); Armco, Inc. v. NLRB, 832 F.2d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 1987)
(same); NLRB v. Am. Seaway Foods, Inc., 702 F.2d 630, 633 n.3 (6th Cir. 1983) (per
curiam); NLRB v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 428 F.2d 479,484 (6th Cir. 1970).
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consider the history of collective bargaining in the unit, among the group to
be accreted, and in the industry. 63 "Bargaining history is given substantial
weight largely because continuing an established unit structure is viewed as
promoting stability, one of the purposes of the NLRA."' 64 "The history of
collective bargaining engaged in between the employer and a unit of
employees, while not determinative of the question, is ordinarily not
' 65
disturbed unless 'compelling circumstances' preclude its application."'
Thus, where the unit to be accreted had a long history of being its own
independent bargaining unit, this "fact alone suggests the appropriateness"
of it remaining separate from another preexisting unit. 166 Where the
67
bargaining history is short-say, a year-the Board is less deferential.
This factor obviously dovetails with the ninth community of interest factor
(whether the group to be accreted independently constitutes an appropriate
unit), since a group that has a collective bargaining history almost certainly
was an appropriate unit.
Frequently the group of employees to be accreted will have no
collective bargaining history, 68 which sometimes suggests that their
interests are separate and distinct from the organized unit, especially where
the units existed side by side with each other for a considerable period of
time. Where the two units once shared the same union, a further
commonality is shared, although this might also indicate that substantial
differences arose, since one group decided it no longer wished to be
affiliated with the union representing the other. On the other hand, where
the two groups are or were represented by different unions, there is a
suggestion that the groups have some differences of interest or opinion that
impede an accretion. 69 Because the Board does not wish to foment discord
among competing unions, it will not impose an accretion where such

163. NLRB v. Lundy Packing Co., 68 F.3d 1577, 1580 (4th Cir. 1995; Armco Inc., 832
F.2d at 363 (examining the bargaining histories of both the preexisting unit and the one
denied accretion). See Bay Med. Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 588 F.2d 1174, 1177 (6th Cir. 1978)
("Courts have long recognized that the Board may take bargaining history into account
when determining whether a proposed unit is appropriate."); THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW,
supra note 25 (the Board considers collective bargaining history); FALCONE, supra note 157,
at 236 (The Board "considers the history of collective bargaining in the plant and in similar
plants of the industry .... ").
164. GETMAN, supra note 2, at 100 n.45 (citing Buffalo Broadcasting Co., Inc., 242
N.L.R.B. 1105 (1979); Marion Power Shovel Co., Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 576 (1977)).
165. MORRIs D. FORKOSCH, A TREATISE ON LABOR LAW 690 (1953) (footnotes omitted).
Although Professor Forkosch was writing about the determination of the appropriateness of
a unit generally, his words hold true as to accretions.
166. Armco Inc., 832 F.2d at 363.
167. FORKOSCH, supra note 165, at 691.

168. See Westvaco, Va., Folding Box Div. v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 1171, 1177 (4th Cir.
1986) (discussing the lack of collective bargaining history as a factor barring accretion).
169. Staten Island Univ. Hosp. v. NLRB, 24 F.3d 450, 456 (2d Cir. 1994).
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rivalry exists unless one union clearly predominates in popularity and
strength.'°
13. Extent of Union Organization in the Unit
In assessing accretions, "[1]ike-mindedness about the union movement
is one common interest the Board may weigh in determining an appropriate
grouping of employees. ' 7 ' Under this factor, the Board considers the
extent of union support and organization in the group to be accreted.'72 Of
course, the union will seek an accretion where it has organized, or can
reasonably expect to organize, the accreted employees, or at least where
they won't jeopardize its present majority status.1 73 Therefore, a union
frequently will support or oppose an accretion depending on the extent to
which it has organized those employees, and the Board will give great
deference to the union's desires.
Previously, in making unit
determinations, the Board made no secret that it often considers this factor
to be dispositive.174 In effect, it ceded its responsibility for making unit
determination decisions to unions. In response, Congress added § 9(c)(5)
to the NLRA, which provides that the Board should no longer rely solely
on this factor in making unit determinations, nor should it give this factor
controlling weight. 75 But the Board still considers the extent of union
organization:
So long as the Board gives less than controlling weight to the
extent of organization, its unit determination does not contravene
the statute.
It may even treat extent of organization as a
determinative factor which tilts the balance in favor of a
particular unit and still comply with the statutor7 command that

extent of organization not be a controlling factor.
Old habits die hard, so the Board has found ways to get around §
9(c)(5) in unit determination cases.
One way is to require an
"overwhelming community of interest" (the test for accretions) before it

170. William B. Gould, Recognition Laws: The U.S. Experience and its Relevance to the
U.K., 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 11, 22 (1998).
171. Pac. Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1032, 1044 (9th Cir. 1978).
172. GOLDER, supra note 51. See NLRB v. Lundy Packing Co., 68 F.3d 1577, 1580 (4th
Cir. 1995) (citing the twelve factors for an appropriate unit among which the extent of union
organization is a factor).
173. Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 934 F.2d 898, 900 (7th Cir. 1991).
174. Lundy Packing Co., 68 F.3d at 1580.
175. Id.; Kaynard v. Mego Corp., 633 F.2d 1026, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980); 29 U.S.C. §
159(c)(5) (1994) ("In determining whether a unit is appropriate for the purposes specified in
subsection (b) the extent to which the employees have organized shall not be controlling.").
176. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25.
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will expand a union-approved unit. 7 7 The Fourth Circuit saw through the
Board's practice and correctly labeled it a violation of § 9(c)(5), but only in
straight unit determination cases.178 But the Fourth Circuit conceded that
the Board may give this factor a preeminent position in accretion cases,
purportedly because the magnitude of harm from a potential error is greater
in accretion cases (due to the employees' inability to vote for or against
union representation), and so the Board is free to use any device that will
ensure the accreted employees are substantially similar to their counterparts
in the preexisting unit.179 This is a de facto concession that the Board
frequently bases its accretion decisions on whether the accretion will assist
the union already in place in the organized unit. Even without the Board's
thumb on the scale, under this factor a presumption arises that where an
employer acquires a bargaining unit that is already represented by a union,
the employees prefer a continuation of this representation over an accretion
to another unit with a competing union. 8 ° In many cases this presumption
may accurately reflect employee views. But in other instances it may be
erroneous; yet there is no mechanism for rebutting the "union preference"
presumption. A system that permits employees to vote on proposed
accretions, like the one proposed below, may be the only way to extricate
employees from this mess and allow them to determine their own futures.
14. Whether the Group to be Accreted Existed at the Time the
Existing Bargaining Unit was Recognized, and Whether it
Was Excluded From the Unit
The Board also looks to see whether the group to be accreted existed
at the time the existing bargaining unit was recognized, and if so, whether it
was intentionally excluded from the bargaining unit either by the union or
the employer.' 8' Like other factors, the Board has sometimes labeled this
the "overriding" factor in an accretion case, 182 such that it is often not
considered to be a factor in the community
of interest test at all, but rather
.. 183
an independent bar to an accretion.
Under the Board's Loconia Shoe
177. Lundy Packing Co., 68 F.3d at 1581.
178. Id.
179. Id. ("The Board's ruling thus exhibits the indicia of a classic § 9(c)(5) violation.").
180. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 280 (1972).
181. NLRB v. Stevens Ford, Inc., 773 F.2d 468, 474 (2d Cir. 1985).
182. King Radio Corp., 257 N.L.R.B. 521, 526 (1981).
183. Teamsters Nat'l United Parcel Serv. Negotiating Comm. v. NLRB, 17 F.3d 1518,
1520-21 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (discussing how the Board declined to apply the community of
interest test because the employees in question were previously excluded from the
bargaining unit). See Local 144 v. NLRB, 9 F.3d 218, 223 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing the
lack of incorporation to other existing bargaining unit when the added employees constitute
a separate bargaining unit); Stevens Ford, Inc., 773 F.2d at 474 (commenting on the
overriding factor in an accretion case being whether the group wanting to be accreted had
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rule, if "the group was in existence and excluded
from an election, then
1 84
accretion should not normally be permitted.

There may be several rationales for this rule. First is a presumption
that historically excluded employees lack a community of interest with the
unit employees. "[I]f neither the Company nor the Union insisted upon
including a particular group of employees in a bargaining unit at its
formation, then the excluded employees are thereafter conclusively
presumed to lack a community of interest with those in the bargaining
unit."' 85 A second rationale is that the group did not initially join the unit
because its members were not interested in union representation, perhaps
86
explaining why the union did not push for their initial inclusion.1
Exclusion casts "doubt upon the Union's majority status" among the
group's employees.
In such a case, it would be particularly unfair to foist
a union upon the employees, as they have previously voiced their
opposition to the union by declining to join the unit. Accreting them to the
unit they declined to join, after the unit has had its own election, serves the
union's interests by increasing the size of the unit, and it may likewise
serve the employer's interests by ensuring that it will not have to bargain
with more than one union. But these benefits come at the expense of the
employees' freedom, particularly their right to decline association with the
preexisting unit and its union. As the Second Circuit observed:
If groups of employees may be permissibly accreted to a
bargaining unit after they have been earlier excluded from an
election in that unit, strategic selection of one group for election
purposes followed by accretion will lead to a larger bargaining
unit in which the bargaining representative does not have
majority status. Such bootstrapping violates
the Act's policies
8
favoring the free choice of employees.1
Thus, where the accreted group was previously excluded from the
189
unit, the accretion is improper.
The NLRB and the courts sometimes place great emphasis on this
been in existence at the time the existing bargaining unit was recognized); Horn & Hardart,
439 F.2d at 682 (stating that no accretion is to be found if the group had been in existence at
the time the existing group executed a contract).
184. Stevens Ford, Inc., 773 F.2d at 474. See also Horn & Hardart,439 F.2d at 682;
United Parcel Serv., 303 N.L.R.B. 326, 327 (1991); King Radio Corp., 257 N.L.R.B. 521,
526 (1981); Laconia Shoe Co., 215 N.L.R.B. 573, 576 (1974).
185. Teamsters Nat'l United Parcel Serv. Negotiating Comm., 17 F.3d at 1521 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
186. Id. at 1524 ("[It is reasonable for the Board to presume that, absent some indication
to the contrary, the majority of a group that has historically been excluded from a bargaining
unit does not support the union that represents that unit.").
187. Id.
188. Stevens Ford, Inc., 773 F.2d at 474.
189. Id.
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factor. The Board has observed: "When a group has in fact been excluded
for a significant period of time from an existing production and
maintenance unit, the Board will not permit their accretion without an
election or a showing of majority among them even if no other union could
obtain representative status for them."' 90 Notably, this rule applies
regardless of whether the union intentionally excluded the group from the
existing unit or whether it was mere negligence or an oversight.' 9'
In some circuits the union can rebut the presumption that it lacks
majority support among the group to be accreted by presenting substantial
evidence to the contrary.1 92 Allowing this presumption to be rebutted
indicates that a history of exclusion is simply one factor in the analysis and
not absolutely conclusive of the accretion question. While the Board has
not listed the types of evidence that will rebut the presumption of a lack of
majority support,
the evidence obviously must be more than opinion and
'93
conjecture.
Because a union can obtain an election merely by obtaining a
sufficient number of union authorization cards, this would certainly be
sufficient to rebut the presumption. Other evidence might include survey
or poll results, or a substantial number of affidavits from group employees
stating that they support the union and believe that a majority of their
colleagues do also.
B.

Balancing the Community of Interest Factors

In almost all accretion cases, some of the fourteen community of
interest factors will suggest that an accretion is proper, while others will
point in the opposite direction. This conflict necessitates a balancing of the
factors. When performing this balancing, the Board should keep in mind
the competing policy considerations that inhere in an accretion
determination. 94 On the one hand, the doctrine is designed to preserve
industrial stability by allowing adjustments to the bargaining units to
conform to changing industrial conditions without requiring an adversary

190. Laconia Shoe, 215 N.L.R.B. at 576. See Teamsters Nat'l United Parcel Serv.
Negotiating Comm., 17 F.3d at 1521 (quoting Laconia Shoe); King Radio, 257 N.L.R.B. at

526 (citing Laconia Shoe).
191.

Teamsters Nat'l United Parcel Serv. Negotiating Comm.,

17 F.3d at

1522

(discussing how conscious exclusion was treated as additional evidence of the employees'
historical exclusion).
192. Id. at 1521 (a group's historical exclusion "is determinative against their later
accretion absent evidence of the majority's preference") (internal quotations omitted).
193. Id. at 1524 (stating the evidentiary standard: clear and cogent evidence of "'good
faith reasonable doubt' as to the union's majority status.").
194. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 759 F.2d 1477, 1480
(9th Cir. 1985) (commenting on the necessity of balancing the "stability of labor relations
and employees' freedom to choose their own bargaining agents.").
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election every time new jobs are created or other alterations are made.1 95
On the other hand, employees have a § 7 right to choose their own
bargaining agent, or not to affiliate with a union at all. 96 Because the
existing accretion doctrine restricts the employees' fundamental right to
choose their own bargaining representative, 197 in considering an accretion,
concern for employee freedom must be paramount. 98 Accordingly, the
Board and most circuits have several specific rules against accretions
involving particular types of employees,' 99 and they generally give the
accretion doctrine a restricted application. 2°
For example, the Ninth
Circuit correctly holds that close accretion cases-those in which the
variable weight of the fourteen factors almost evenly balance the accretion
scale-should be resolved against the accretion and in favor of a vote by
the employees, as this preserves the employees' § 7 rights. 20 1 "Refusing
accretion in doubtful cases is preferable because it protects the employee's
freedom to choose his bargaining representative. 2 2 Other courts also
probably follow this rule, as judicially approved accretions are somewhat
rare. The Board, however, generally is willing to permit accretions even in
close cases when the accretion is supported by a union. 2°3 The Board takes
195. Brooklyn Hosp. Ctr., 309 N.L.R.B. 1163, 1182 (1992). See Local 144 v. NLRB, 9
F.3d 218, 223 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Accretion promotes the policy of industrial stability.").
196. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994) ("Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing... and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities ....
")(emphasis added).
197. Local 144, 9 F.3d at 223 ("[A]ccretion can preclude self-determination and
therefore should be narrowly applied to situations where the smaller group has lost its
separate, independent identity.").
198. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 759 F.2d at 1480.
199. For example, the Board has a policy that office and plant clerical employees should
not be joined in the same bargaining unit, absent some agreement between the parties. This
policy is based on the presumption that these employees do not share the community of
interest necessary for the creation of a single bargaining unit. NLRB v. Am. Seaway Foods,
Inc., 702 F.2d 630, 632 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). This policy "serves as a guide in
defining appropriate bargaining units." Id.
200. Kaynard v. Mego Corp., 633 F.2d 1026, 1030 (2d Cir. 1980); Boire v. Int'l Bd. of
Teamsters, 479 F.2d 778, 795 (5th Cir. 1973) ("[T]he Board has traditionally been reluctant
to find an accretion, even where the resulting unit would be appropriate, in those cases
where a smaller unit, consisting solely of the accreted unit, would also be appropriate and
the § 7 rights of the accreted employees would be better preserved by denying the
accretion."). See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25, at 405 ("The Board has
consistently indicated a somewhat restrictive attitude toward accretions in deference to the
important statutory policy of employee free choice.").
201. Int'lAss'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 759 F.2d at 1480.
202. Westvaco, Va., Folding Box Div. v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 1171, 1177 (4th Cir. 1986).
203. Despite their initial preference for a smaller unit, unions often seeks accretions.
See, e.g., Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 759 F.2d at 1478 (relating facts
concerning a union-supported accretion). This seems rational, as accretions allow the union
to acquire new members without having to expend resources to carry out an organizing
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a different approach when an employer seeks an accretion. Indeed, among
published Courts of Appeals decisions, there are few in which the Board or
Courts of Appeals have permitted an employer-supported accretion.2° In
any event, the few pro-employer accretions pale in comparison to the
number of union-supported accretions permitted by the Board.2 °5 Perhaps
campaign or election. Furthermore, in such a case a union need not face the possibility, no
matter how insignificant, that it will lose an election. Unions might also "be better off with
larger units because this would facilitate the mediation of conflicts among subgroups of
employees." Posner, supra note 7, at 1009 (citing Douglas Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units,
70 VA. L. REV. 353, 50 (1984)).
204. There are many cases where an accretion inures to an employer's benefit, and in
such cases the employer will battle for the accretion. See, e.g., Staten Island Univ. Hosp. v.
NLRB, 24 F.3d 450, 451 (2d Cir. 1994); Kaynard, 633 F.2d at 1027; NLRB v. SecurityColumbian Banknote, 541 F.2d 135, 138 (3d Cir. 1976). For example, employers will
support accretions where they would result in imposing terms and conditions of employment
favorable to the employer. Similarly, where an employer would prefer one union over
another, or an existing union over a newcomer, it will often fight to have the Board find an
accretion. See, e.g., Kaynard, 633 F.2d at 1029 (employer and Teamsters claimed that
accretion resulted in a single unit represented by the Teamsters, rather than two units, one of
which the International Brotherhood of Craftsmen sought to organize). Along these same
lines, an employer might support an accretion where it is relatively happy with the existing
union and fears that a more vociferous bargaining agent might later organize the accretable
unit and perhaps eventually spread to other units.
An employer might also favor an accretion to minimize transaction costs where an
accretion would entail having to deal with only one union. See, e.g., Staten Island Univ.
Hosp., 24 F.3d at 451 (employer and Nurses Association argued that the merger of two
hospitals resulted in an accretion resulting in a single unit represented by the Nurses
Association, rather than two units, one of which was represented by the United Federation
of Teachers). Uniformity of terms and conditions of employment might also be a strong
selling point for an employer that seeks a "one size fits all" relationship with employees.
Also, where the employer suspects that the accretable employees might provide it with a
majority of non-union votes in a subsequent election, it might also find accretion palatable.
Finally, an employer might support an accretion when threatened or when it fears vandalism
and violence from a union. For a discussion of union-sponsored violence see Witt v.
Roadway Express, 136 F.3d 1424, 1428 (10th Cir. 1998) (black truck driver who elected not
to pay union dues received notes written on Ku Klux Klan letterhead which said: "Pay your
dues, n-"; he was later called into a motel room where several drivers attempted to coerce
him into dropping his complaint against the union); Standifer v. Gen. Teamsters Union No.
460, No. 97-2037, 1998 WL 229553, at *3 (D. Kan. Apr. 13) (union picketers repeatedly
yelled racial epithets at black workers, including "slave boy," "boy," and "black nigger";
after forcing a truck driven by one plaintiff off the road, and while pounding on the disabled
truck, the strikers yelled "[k]ill the nigger" and "hang the nigger"; the union mob struck the
driver with a weapon; on other occasions, the mob yelled: "Nigger boy, remember that you
have to leave tonight and we can't wait to get your nigger ass. We're going to mess you up
bad.").
205. Ogden Entm't Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 105 F.3d 666, Nos. 95-70777, 95-70867 1997
WL 14361 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished order) (enforcing NLRB's order in which it found
that an accretion was warranted); Cent. Soya Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 867 F.2d 1245 (10th Cir.
1989) (per curiam) (agreeing with the NLRB that accretion was proper); NLRB v. DMR
Corp., 795 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1986) (same); NLRB v. St. Regis Paper Co., 674 F.2d 104 (1st
Cir. 1982) (same); NLRB v. J.W. Rex Co., 243 F.2d 356 (3d Cir. 1957) (same).
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this is because the union is more in tune with the community of interest
shared by employees, but more likely it indicates pro-union bias in the
balancing of the accretion factors. 0 6
207
In practice, a balancing is required in almost every case.
Because
the factors are broad and varied, it is a rare case where at least some of the
Because the
relevant factors don't point in opposite directions.' ° 8
community of interest factors can exist to varying degrees and can be
assigned variable weights by the Board, there is certainly no requirement
that all or even most of the community of interest factors point to an
accretion before the Board will countenance such a course of action, 9 only
that the balance of factors supports this result. 2 Accordingly, "a strong
showing on1 just a few of the factors may suffice to sustain the Board's
21
decision.,
When performing this balancing, the Board and the courts stress the
importance of different factors, depending on the case involved. The Board
has candidly admitted that many accretion cases involve close, factual
questions, providing few fixed rules of application.
Because the various factors are weighted differently by the Board
212
from case to case,
an accretion may sometimes be found even where only
a few of the factors support it. Of course, the Board's "differential
weighting" of factors can result in inconsistency in accretion decisions,
with little hope for future correction so long as the community of interest
balancing test is in place.213 Furthermore, parties have not met with success
206. Cont'l Web Press Inc. v. NLRB, 742 F.2d 1087, 1092 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that
the Board in every previous case held that preparatory employees and pressmen should be
part of the same unit and that; contrary to the employer's wishes, but the Board suddenly
departed from this longstanding rule without giving any reason). Such pro-union bias
hardly serves the employees. "Union representation is not always the right choice for
workers; if it were, the law would simply mandate a union for every plant." Samuel
Estreicher, The Dunlop Report and the Future of Labor Law Reform, 12 LAB. LAW. 117,
127 (1996).
207. "[I1t is rare in any given case that all of the factors point conveniently in the
direction of the same size unit." Cox, supra note 11.
208. Gould, Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 442, 445 (1982) ("In the normal situation some elements
militate toward and some against accretion, so that a balancing of them is necessary.").
209. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 759 F.2d at 1480.
210. JENKINS, supra note 51.
211. NLRB v. Heartshare Human Servs., 108 F.3d 467, 472 (2d Cir. 1997).
212. John P. Scripps Newspaper Corp., 329 N.L.R.B. 854, 1999 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 740, at
*18 (1999) ("'in some cases the Board gives greater weight to some factors than to
others ... ')(quoting Great A & P Tea Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 1011 (1963)).
213. Matthew S. Miner, Note, Reforming Accretion Analysis Under the NLRA:
Supplementing a Borrowed Analysis with Meaningful Policy Considerations,31 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 515, 522 (1998) ("[T]he present framework lacks clarity and is inconsistently
applied.") (footnotes omitted). Miner agrees that the Board's use of the community of
interest test is flawed, especially insofar as it fails to give employee preference any
meaningful consideration. He suggests reforming the community of interest balancing test
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when they have complained about the weight the Board has assigned to
particular factors case or the Board's unprincipled reliance on whatever
factors it considers most important on a given day,214 such that the Board
result. 215
ignores other relevant factors that militate in favor of a different
Because the Board relies on the factual minutiae of accretion cases in
making its accretion decision, few binding principles or rules can be
extracted for application in future accretion cases, which is a recurring
defect in multi-factored balancing tests.216 This, in turn, makes it almost
by explicitly requiring a consideration of employees' views on the particular accretion. He
also thinks that the employer's motive for opposing or promoting an accretion is important
to a proper analysis of accretion cases, and therefore proposes that this be another factor
considered in the balancing test.
Although these suggestions have some merit, tinkering with the balancing test is not a
real solution to the problem, particularly because the various factors have no fixed weight
and thus can be emphasized or ignored depending on the whims of the Board or the courts
that apply this balancing "test." Even requiring the Board to give employee views greater
weight is insufficient to protect their § 7 rights. Assume that in a certain case the employees
unanimously agree that they do not want to be accreted and that an accretion is contrary to
their interests. Even if this were given great weight, there is nothing to prevent the Board
from assigning greater weight to other factors, and finding that the sum of all other factors
supporting the accretion is weightier.
214. Statutes like the NLRA assigned great discretion to administrative agencies like the
NLRB, because legal scholars of their age, influenced by legal realism, believed that the
courts placed too much emphasis on individual rights. Administrative regulation, the New
Dealers thought:
[H]ad the potential to reduce the power of the judges the legal realists had
taught them to suspect. Instead of allowing courts, which venerated individual
rights, to decide issues, they hoped to increase the authority of administrative
agencies whose officials would make hard choices on an ad hoc, continuing
basis to promote the common good.
LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS 32 (1990) (footnote omitted). They have succeeded insofar
as nobody can accuse the NLRB of protecting individual rights in accretion cases, especially
those of the workers, and the Board certainly makes accretion decisions on an ad hoc, if
biased, basis, as opposed to a principled one. It is doubtful, however, that this promotes the
common good.
215. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 759 F.2d 1477, 1480
(9th Cir. 1985) ("The Union argues ... that the Board erred by not effectively balancing all
the factors, in that it relied heavily upon two of the factors.") (internal quotations omitted).
216. Some clear-cut rules are certainly possible in the accretion context, and would be
particularly helpful to employers, unions, and the courts. Nevertheless, the Board, as usual,
elects not to exercise its rule-making power. In the accretion context, as in many others,
"the rule-making power is preferable to case-to-case decisions because it tends to promote,
not to undermine, evenhanded justice." KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 165 (1971). "Unfortunately, even when rule-making procedure is
clearly required by statute, some agencies refuse to follow the prescribed procedure. The
outstanding [example of] such a federal agency is the National Labor Relations Board,
which has illegally and inexcusably used the procedure of adjudication for rulemaking .. " Id. at 68 n.17; see generally Cornelius Peck, The Atrophied Rule Making
Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961 )(concluding that the
NLRB's view of the need for substantive rule-making is untenable).
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impossible for the Board's accretion decisions to have any precedential
effect.217 Among other things, this means that the Board's power remains
unchecked by the citizenry, because litigants cannot tell whether the
Board's • accretion
decisions are the result of arbitrary will or sound
218
reasoning.
Because the Board is only loosely bound by its own
precedent in this area, it has substantial freedom to alter the analysis from
case to case,219 thereby making accountability and predictability highly
elusive features in accretion cases. 220 Beyond the basic assault on the rule
of law that this produces,221 the Board's accretion decisions result in
needless litigation, especially where the relevant facts are substantially
identical to those of cases previously decided by the Board.222 It is highly
inefficient for the Board members to constantly "rethink a question they
have once resolved to their own satisfaction. 223 Unfortunately, the
litigants, and not the Board, pay the costs of this mostly unnecessary
litigation.
These problems stem from the NLRB's extremely broad discretion in
balancing the accretion factors and its largely unrestrained power to decide
217. Thus, it is unlikely that the Board's accretion decisions adhere to the doctrine of
precedents. "The doctrine of precedents means that causes are to be judged by principles
reached inductively from the judicial experience of the past, not by deduction from rules
established arbitrarily by the sovereign will. In other words, reason, not arbitrary will is to
be the ultimate ground of decisions." ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW
182-83 (1921).
218. "Lacking the democratic legitimacy of legislatures, agencies do not have the same
freedom to base decisions on arbitrary grounds ....
" United States v. Tomasino, 206 F.3d
739 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, C.J.).
219. As Justice Cardozo noted: "It will not do to decide the same question one way
between one set of litigants and the opposite way between another." BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 33 (1920).
220. NLRB v. Lundy Packing Co., 68 F.3d 1577, 1583 (4th Cir. 1995) ("We recognize
that bargaining unit cases are fact-sensitive and that decisional law will seldom travel a
straight-line course."). See International Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Davis, 476
U.S. 380, 407 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting the need for uniformity in labor
cases).
221. "The rule of law is not quite a law of rules, but it is a law of rules, principles,
customs, practices, and understandings. It is law responsibleto criteriathat in the end we
can learn and communicate to others. It may be as definite as a rule, or as tacit as the
understanding of language by a native speaker. Still, it always has an important measure of
definiteness; the law is something one can come to know; and knowledgeable people can
tell good from bad law." CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN
REVOLUTION 60 (1991) (emphasis added).
222. "People are entitled to know the legal rules before they act, and only the most
compelling reason should lead a court to announce an approach under which no one can
know where he stands until litigation has been completed. Litigation is costly and
introduces risk into any endeavor; we should struggle to eliminate the risk and help people
save the costs." Sec'y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1539 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring).
223. DAVIS, supra note 216, at 108.
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whether new employees should be considered an accretion to an existing
bargaining unit.2 24 The only requirement the appellate courts impose on the
Board is that it not abuse its discretion in making accretion decisions. In
theory, this means that the Board cannot act arbitrarily in deciding
accretion cases. As the Fourth Circuit observed:
Although broad, the Board's discretion is not without limit. In
particular, when the Board adopts a policy to guide it in the
exercise of its discretion, the original very broad discretion is to
some extent narrowed, and subsequent decisions must be
reasonably consistent with the expressed policy. If the Board
chooses to depart from established policy, it must explicitly
announce the change and its reasons for the change. 221
Thus, ideally the Board must apply with reasonable consistency the
standards it adopts to guide its accretion decisions. 226 But because it is so
easy to distinguish previous accretion decisions (especially where the
reasoning behind the decision is utterly ambiguous), the Board in fact has
substantial freedom to do whatever it wants, unencumbered by the results
and rationale of prior decisions. In theory, once the Board has selected
criteria to guide its discretion, it must apply these principles consistently
from case to case. In reality, inconsistency abounds.
This problem is entirely attributable to the Board and its decision not
to tie itself to a definite standard of judgment. Addressing the Board's
practices in the context of unit determinations, Judge Posner has eloquently
described the Board's treatment of the community of interest test, which
similarly applies to the Board's accretion decisions:
The Board has a standard: it will approve a unit if but only if the
members have a "community of interest." But the words provide little
direction. There is a sense in which all people employed in the same firm,
the same craft, or even the same industry share a community of interest,
and there is a sense in which every worker is a separate "community of
interest" because workers differ in age, in the value they place on leisure, in
their preferred trade-off between present and future consumption, in their
attitude toward risk, and in other dimensions, which, when all are added
together, make every worker unique. It would have been helpful, therefore,
if the Board had tried to give "community of interest" a precise meaning, or
224. Int'lAss'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 759 F.2d at 1478.

225. Westvaco, Va., Folding Box Div. v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 1171, 1173 (4th Cir. 1986);
see Cont'l Web Press Inc. v. NLRB, 742 F.2d 1087, 1089 (7th Cir. 1984) ("About all the
court can do-recognizing that section 9(b) is a broad delegation of power to the Board-is
to insist that the Board apply with reasonable consistency whatever standard it adopts to
guide the exercise of its delegated power.").
226. See NLRB v. Lundy Packing Co., 68 F.3d 1577, 1583 (4th Cir. 1995) (explaining
that that bargaining-unit cases are fact specific and that decisional law is likely to be
somewhat ambiguous).
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at least had explained the purpose behind the formula. The Board has done
neither of these things.227
The Board has modified the "community of interest" test in accretion
cases by requiring an "overwhelming community of interest." But simply
adding one word to the name of the test adds nothing helpful to courts or
litigants. Zero multiplied even an "overwhelming" number of times is still
zero.
Despite Judge Posner's recognition of the NLRB's failure to give
intelligent meaning to the "community of interest" test, some courts claim
to have distilled some guiding principles from the Board's accretion
decisions. When examined closely, however, these claims appear overly
optimistic. For example, in one case, the Ninth Circuit perceived two
factors to be particularly important in determining whether an
overwhelming community of interest was present: (1) employee
interchange; and (2) overlapping day-to-day supervision.
True, where
both of these are absent, it is more difficult for the Board to find an
overwhelming community of interest, and thus it is unlikely that it will
permit an accretion in such a case.229 In another case, however, the Ninth
Circuit found a different factor to be paramount. It suggested: "The most
reliable indicium of common interests among employees... is similarity in
their skills, duties and working conditions. 23 °
Things become more complicated as other Circuits weigh in. Taking
a slightly narrower view, the Sixth Circuit focused only on wages, benefits,
and working conditions, finding these to be the most important factors: the
"primary concern or touchstone of a bargaining unit determination is the
question of whether all of the members have a mutual interest in wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. This key factor
assumes special prominence in any bargaining unit determination. ' The

227. Cont'l Web Press, Inc., 742 F.2d at 1089-90.
228. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 759 F.2d at 1480. The Board
similarly has identified these as the two most important factors. Towne Ford Sales, 270
N.L.R.B. 311 (1984); New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 280 N.L.R.B. 162 (1986).
229. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 759 F.2d at 1480 (finding no
accretion where there was a lack of employee interchange and separate day-to-day
supervision); Bryan Infants Wear Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 1305, 1306 (1978) (finding no
accretion in situations where there was a lack of employee interchange and independent
day-to-day supervision).
230. Pac. Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1032, 1042 (9th Cir. 1978). It may be
that in different cases different factors take on great importance, and so the Ninth Circuit
decisions may be reconcilable on this basis. However, the attempt to reconcile the cases
demonstrate a central thesis of this article: that the community of interest balancing test is so
case-specific as to be useless in attempting to predict the outcome of even closely similar
cases. Furthermore, it shows that "importance" is not based on any external, objective
criteria.
231. NLRB v. Catherine McCauley Health Ctr., 885 F.2d 341, 345 (6th Cir. 1989)
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Seventh Circuit largely agrees with the Sixth Circuit, noting that the
"greatest conflicts of interest among workers are over wages, fringe
benefits, and working conditions, ' 3 2 and because the overwhelming
community of interest test is designed to minimize these conflicts, the test's
foremost concern should be with the similarity of wages and working
conditions. As the previous discussion of the community of interest factors
demonstrates, the Board and the courts characterize many different factors
as "important" and "substantial," depending on the factual intricacies of
individual cases. 2 3' This shows, yet again, that when applying the
"overwhelming community of interest" balancing test, importance is in the
eye of the beholder. Mere mortals are incapable of divining which factors
the Board will find controlling in any particular case.
II.

ACCRETION ANALYSIS: A NEW APPROACH

Perhaps the time is now ripe for a new approach for deciding accretion
cases. After appreciating the magnitude of the defects associated with the
"overwhelming community of interest" balancing test, it's easy to see that
any replacement system must meet five criteria. An improved method of
analyzing accretions should (1) be based on objective criteria; (2) be easy
to apply; (3) protect employee freedom of choice, including both the
employees to be accreted and their counterparts in the established unit; (4)
ensure that the employees' interests are served; and (5) protect unions and
preexisting units from destabilizing accretions. A system that meets these
prerequisites is presently available. It is a ballot system that requires
majority support for all substantial accretions.
Under the proposed ballot system discussed below, an accretion would
be initiated much as it is now. First, either the union representing the
preexisting unit or the employer would move to accrete the group. This
would be accomplished by the union demanding that the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) apply to the new group of employees, or by
insisting that it is the bargaining representative of the group, based on the
accretion. Similarly, the employer could attempt an accretion by applying
the unit's CBA to the accreted group. If nobody objects, a successful and
(internal citation omitted). Of course, to the extent that daily supervision is a component of
"other terms and conditions of employment," the Sixth Circuit's observation is not
inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's. Also, it may be that the Sixth Circuit considers the
employee's duties to be a part of the "terms and conditions of employment," as this
comports with some definitions under Title VII.
232. Cont'l Web Press Inc., 742 F.2d at 1091.

233. Besides the factors just discussed, the degree of employee interchange and contact
among the two groups of employees is also considered one of the "most important" factors
in the accretion analysis. See NLRB v. Lundy Packing Co., 68 F.3d 1577, 1580 (4th Cir.
1995)
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uncontested accretion has occurred. More likely, though, a proposed
accretion will be opposed by the unit's bargaining representative, another
union, the employer, or the accreted employees. In these instances
employee voting would come into play. Where an accretion is contested,
the Board would follow alternative voting procedures, which depend upon
the party seeking the accretion. Of course, in all instances, an accretion
would occur only if it were in accordance with the limitations on
appropriate units set forth in § 9 of the NLRA.3
A.

Employer-SupportedAccretions

Like unions, employers sometimes seek recognition of accretions.235
Frequently this occurs when the employer has an accretion clause in a CBA
236
in which it agreed to support one of two rival unions,
or when, even
though no accretion clause exists, two rival unions are fighting over
employees and the employer agrees to aid one of the unions. 37 Where the

234. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(2001)("[T]he Board shall not... (3) decide that any unit is
appropriate for such purposes if it includes, together with other employees, any individual
employed as a guard to enforce against employees and other persons rules to protect
property of the employer .. ").
235. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25. As noted below, usually an employer
seeks an accretion only where the reconstituted unit will be represented by a union that
supports the accretion. It is possible, however, that an employer could seek an accretion
opposed by the union that presently represents the preexisting. An employer might do this
where it hopes to add union opponents to a unit already full of discontent with the union.
This is essentially what the employer attempted in Serramonte Oldsmobile, Inc. v. NLRB,
86 F.3d 227, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
236. In such cases, an accretion election would be particularly useful, as the Board has
held that an employer need not honor an accretion clause unless the union seeking to apply
the clause presents proof of its majority support. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note

25.
237. See, e.g., Serramonte Oldsmobile, Inc., 86 F.3d at 236 (explaining the employer's
argument that technicians were accreted to a bargaining unit, and that a majority of the
reconstituted unit opposed the union); Staten Island Univ. Hosp. v. NLRB, 24 F.3d 450, 451
(2d Cir. 1994) (describing the argument between an employer and the Nurses Association
about a merger of two hospitals that resulted in an accretion which created a single unit
represented by the Nurses Association, rather than two units, one of which had been
represented by the United Federation of Teachers); Kaynard v. Mego Corp., 623 F.2d 1026
(2d Cir. 1980) (explaining employer's and Teamsters' claim that accretion resulted in a
single unit represented by the Teamsters, rather than two units, one of which the
International Brotherhood of Craftsmen sought to organize); NLRB v. Security-Columbian
Banknote, 541 F.2d 135, 135 (3d Cir. 1976) (arguing that accretion resulted in a single unit
of offset printers, so that it properly bargained with the Graphic Arts Union rather than the
Pressman's union). Often the employer may consider accretion to be the lesser of two evils
where two rival unions seek to represent the new employees. Similarly, an employer may
have had a tolerable relationship with one union, and figuring that dealing with a known
entity is better than the uncertainty of the alternative union, it may seek an accretion to the
unit represented by the preferred union.

2002]

ACCRETION ELECTIONS

employer is the party seeking the accretion (whether on its own initiative or
at the behest of a union), it is essential to ensure that the accretion does not
destabilize the unit, and that it is not simply part of an employer's scheme
to destroy a union that has the popular support of employees. The
proposed ballot system is designed to ensure that this does not happen,
while at the same time making certain that the desires of the employees are
held paramount and their § 7 rights are maximized. It does this, first, by
requiring a showing of minimal support among both the employees to be
accreted and those of the preexisting unit, as it would be senseless to
burden the parties with an election campaign if the accretion lacks even
minimal support from the rank and file.
To obtain an accretion election, then, the employer would be required
to obtain signed statements of support for the accretion from thirty percent
of the members of the group to be accreted, and thirty percent of the
employees in the preexisting unit. If, at this preliminary stage, an employer
cannot obtain the requisite signature cards from either group, he is
temporarily out of luck, but remains free to make another attempt in the
future. This "minimal support" rule, which mirrors that imposed on unions
seeking to organize a unit,238 protects a union that opposes the accretion
from having to expend its precious resources to carry out a full-fledged
election campaign. This policy also preserves the Board's resources by
precluding an election where the employer cannot show even minimal
employee support for an accretion. Requiring an initial showing of support
also protects the interests of the employees in the preexisting unit by
allowing them to block an accretion they consider to be detrimental to their
interests, or the interests of their union.
If, however, the employer obtains the requisite statements of support
238. Both certification and decertification elections require a showing of at least thirty
percent support:
[Iit is the policy of the Board to require that a petitioner requesting an election
for either certification of representatives or decertification show that at least
30% of the employees favor an election. The showing of interest must be
exclusively by employees who are in the appropriate bargaining unit in which
the election is sought. Typically a union filing a petition (RC) will submit its
showing in the form of union authorization cards where the employee signs and
dates a card indicating that he or she wishes to have that union represent him for
purposes of collective bargaining. When a group of employees file an "RD"
petition, the same 30% qualification attaches but the showing will typically be
in the form of a list of employees signatures and dates on a letter or petition
indicating that the undersigned employees non longer wish to have the certified
or existing bargaining agent represent them.
GOLDER, supra note 51, at § 2:9, p. 2-22; GETMAN, supra note 2, at 28 ("When it begins to
organize, a union seeks to obtain pledges of support from employees in the unit. These
pledges customarily take the form of authorization cards signed by the employees
designating the union as their bargaining representative.").
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from both thirty percent of the accretable group and thirty percent of the
preexisting unit, the Board would then conduct a secret ballot election
among both of these groups. Both the employer and the union would be
free to campaign for or against the accretion according to the rules already
in place for representation elections. 2 9
Thus, a union opposing the
accretion would have the benefit of Excelsior lists and other benefits that
the Board mandates in representation elections.2 4 0 For the employer to
prevail in the election, a majority of the voters from each group would have
241
to vote in favor of the accretion.
If the employer cannot persuade a
majority of the voters from each group that the accretion is in their best
interests, the proposed accretion will be defeated, and there will be no

accretion for at least one year,242 after which time the employer is free to try
again. If a majority of votes are cast in favor of the accretion, however, the
Board would accept their decision as final, and would hold that the
combined unit is an appropriate one. Of course, this would do away with
the overwhelming community of interest balancing test and the
unprincipled weighing of indeterminate factors. But it would not do away
with a careful consideration of those factors by the people in the best
position to assess them: the employees themselves. Instead of the Board
doing the balancing, the employees themselves would be empowered to
239. This incorporation of NLRB election law is not an endorsement of the archaic rules
promulgated by the Board and the courts, as these rules tend to suppress free speech and the
ideas expressed therein. See, e.g., NLRB v. Exchange Parts, Inc., 375 U.S. 405, 405
(1964)(holding that conferring economic benefits on employees during a representation
election period in an attempt to induce employees to vote against the union interferes with
the protected right to organize). For a criticism of the Exchange Parts decision and a
general discussion of representation elections, see Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of
Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78
HARV. L. REV. 38, 112-15 (1964). But because these rules are already in existence, and the
Board and labor attorneys are intimately familiar with them, their incorporation in accretion
elections furthers the goal of simplifying labor law, or at least does not increase its
complexity. Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389, 394 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[T]here is much to
be said for simplicity in law; it is a value to which American courts give too little weight."),
vacated in part, 165 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1999); DAVIS, supra note 216, at 158 (1971)
("[F]rom the standpoint of a good system of justice, the extreme complexity is much more
harmful than it is helpful.").
240. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1236 (1966) (requiring the
employer to provide to the union the names and addresses of eligible voters).
241. A majority of the votes cast, rather than support from a majority of the employees,
would be required under the proposed system. Mandating the approval of a majority of
employees might be too onerous, as many employees might be too apathetic or uncommitted
to either side to even bother voting. Mere apathy should not be permitted to block an
accretion.
242. Thus, the election bar of § 9(c)(3) would be equally applicable to accretion
elections. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3)(2001) ("No election shall be directed in any bargaining
unit or any subdivision within which in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election
shall have been held.").
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assess their own interests, those of their co-workers, and the common good,
and would be free to decide if in their particular situation they might be
willing to lay some interests aside to gain the greater benefits that an
accretion might entail. And they wouldn't be consigned to a consideration
of only fourteen factors, either. Also gone would be the overwhelming
*uncertainty and extensive litigation2 43that comes with the overwhelming
community of interest balancing test.
This proposed voting procedure ensures that no accretion will occur
unless a majority of the employees-both in the accretable group and the
preexisting unit-believe that an accretion is consistent with their interests
and desires. This system safeguards their § 7 right to be the masters of
their bargaining representative. Although Section III of this article contains
a full discussion of the benefits of the proposed accretion election system,
it's important to note at this point that the election system is superior to the
community of interest balancing test in at least five respects.
First, under the present system, the Board and various courts do not
always consider the views of the accreted employees in balancing the
community of interest factors. 244 The election system effectively rectifies
this problem by making accretions utterly dependent upon employee
choice. Second, even when the Board is inclined to consider the
employees' views, there is often no available data concerning their opinion
of the accretion. By providing a system for clearly expressing their views,
the proposed election system obviously cures this defect too. Third,
presently, even when the Board considers the employees' views, and there
is reliable information available on this subject, this is merely one of
fourteen or so factors that the Board considers. This hardly gives employee
243. As discussed more fully below, there is no real need for the Board or the parties to
waste their time and resources considering the community of interest balancing test where
the employees have voiced their views in an election. Since their interest in effective
representation is at stake, their decision should be final and should not be second-guessed by
the Board. Obviating the need for the community of interest test is one of the chief
advantages of the proposed election system. Nevertheless, if for some reason the Board
refused to countenance a system that completely discarded the community of interest
balancing test, the election system could be modified slightly to accommodate the Board's
concerns. For example, after the election, the Board could permit the parties to present
evidence that the accretion was contrary to the common interests of the employees. It might
simplify matters by distilling the present 14 factor test to, say, consideration of three
essential factors. Under this modified system, however, the Board should contravene the
will of the employees only when the party opposing the accretion carried its burden of
showing by clearand convincing evidence that the two groups do not share a community of
interests.
244. Sometimes this is the implicit practice of the Board, but recall that the Sixth Circuit
has explicitly declined to consider the desires of the employees to be accreted. NLRB v.
Catherine McCauley Health Ctr., 885 F.2d 341, 345 (6th Cir. 1989); Armco, Inc. v. NLRB,
832 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1987); NLRB v. Am. Seaway Foods, Inc., 702 F.2d 630, 633 n.3 (6th
Cir. 1983) (per curiam); NLRB v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 428 F.2d 479, 484 (6th Cir. 1970).
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choice the preeminent consideration it deserves. Moreover, the Board can
capriciously elect to weigh this factor heavily or lightly without having to
justify this caprice. 45 Indeed, it need not assign the various factors any
quantitative value. The proposed election system rectifies these problems
by ensuring that the views of the employees not only have a fixed weight,
but a controlling one.
Fourth, even when data about employee desire is available and the
Board is willing to consider it, unless a secret ballot election is held, and
the employees have an opportunity to hear arguments for and against the
accretion, there exists substantial doubt about whether the employees are
making an informed decision.
Similarly, the data concerning the
employees' views may be inherently misleading. Consider cases where
employees sign authorization cards. While these might accurately reflect
support for a union, they might instead be the product of employees
reluctantly acquiescing to coercive requests for signatures. More than one
employee has signed an authorization card when pressured or coerced by
union supporters or employers.2 6 The proposed election system helps
prevent coercion by making ballots cast in secret the only evidence of
employee support for an accretion.
The election procedure saves
employees the trouble of having to run the gamut of authorization card
solicitors and maximizes their free will. Also, the election process permits
the employer and the unions to educate the employees about the benefits
and detriments that the accretion would likely entail, so that employees can
make an informed decision.
Fifth, under the overwhelming community of interest balancing test,
the views of the unit employees are never directly considered by the Board
or the employer. 7 Thus, if the Board refuses to countenance an accretion,
245. John P. Scripps Newspaper Corp., 329 N.L.R.B. 854, 1999 NLRB LEXIS 740, at
* 18 (September 30, 1999) ("'[I]n some cases the Board gives greater weight to some factors

than to others .... ') (quoting Great A & P Tea Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 1011 (1963)).
246. Indeed, secret ballot elections for the selection of bargaining representatives were
initiated to prevent coercion of employees in making their selection:
In earlier times the union resorted to the strike for recognition as a means of
gaining bargaining rights. Congress sought to end that method by including in
the Act procedures for an orderly election process. A fundamental aim was to
assure employees of a free choice in the selection process and to avoid any
aspect of coercion or interference with that choice.
GOLDER, supra note 51, at § 2:7, p. 2-16 (1999).
247. It is true that the union representing the unit employees has a voice in accretions,
and it might express the sentiments of the employees it represents (assuming that there is a
consensus among employees and that the union can ascertain this consensus). However,
that may not be universally true.
As discussed more fully below, by granting the unit employees an absolute right to
block the accretion, the proposed election system provides them another means of
exercising control over the union and of expressing any dissatisfaction with the union's
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the employees of the preexisting unit may be denied the right to engage in
concerted activity and associate with other employees without having their
views on this subject heard. Similarly, if the Board approves an accretion
unit employees may have an accretion forced upon them, all without ever
having had an opportunity to be heard, which is a basic civil right. 8 The
proposed election system also corrects this oversight. It gives these
employees a right to support or oppose the accretion, perhaps by
campaigning among themselves or the group of employees to be accreted.
The election system also gives them the power to veto an accretion when a
majority of the voting unit members cast their ballots against the
amalgamation of units. Therefore, it is far superior to the present
community of interest balancing test.
B.

Union-InitiatedAccretions

Union-initiated accretions are the most common type of accretions,
and have a greater chance of success under the skewed analysis generally
conducted by the Board. These accretions present dangers similar to those
of employer-initiated accretions, particularly because most employersupported accretions are also desired by at least one union. So a similar set
of rules would apply when a union seeks an accretion to a bargaining unit
that it already represents. Since it is reasonable to presume initially that a
union will not seek an accretion that would harm either itself or the unit
employees to whom it owes a duty of loyalty,249 there is no reason to
initially require a showing of support from thirty percent of the preexisting
unit's employees. 250 Because the employees to be accreted are substantially
affected by the proposed accretion, however, the union would be required
to obtain written statements of support from thirty percent of the group to
be accreted, just as an employer must do in an employer-initiated accretion.
If it is unsuccessful in doing so, no accretion would occur. If it obtains the
performance. Because the unit employees are often in the best position to know when their
union is performing poorly or corruptly, see Kinslow v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 222
F.3d 269, 273 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[U]nion members are often in the best position to discover
union corruption"), by exercising their veto power they can spare the accretable employees
the ordeal of being represented by a lackluster union.
248. "It is sufficient to say that there are certain immutable principles of justice which
inhere in the very idea of free government" including the right to "notice and an opportunity
of being heard .. " Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1898) (Brewer, J.).
249. "The union as the statutory representative of the employees is 'subject always to
complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion."' Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 221 n.15 (1977) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
345 U.S. 330, 338 (1950)).
250. In cases where this presumption proves wrong, the unit employees could later seek
to decertify the union. Although this is not a perfect remedy, it eventually does provide
some relief in egregious cases.
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requisite statements of support, a secret ballot election would be held, just
as in the case of an employer-initiated accretion: the union would have to
carry a majority of the votes from both the group to be accreted and the unit
employees. Where a majority of each group votes in favor of the accretion,
the Board would defer to their wishes and the two groups would be joined
into one unit.25 As with an employer-supported accretion that fails to
garner a majority of votes, no accretion would occur and a subsequent
accretion election could not be held for at least one year.
C.

Union- and Employer-SupportedAccretions

As noted above, sometimes a union and an employer will agree to
accrete a group of employees to the existing union-organized unit, and no
other union.objects. In such situations, there is special cause for concern
for the rights of the employees that will be accreted, as the union-employer
coalition might suggest a mutual lack of concern for the employees'
interests. 252 Accordingly, in these situations, the rules governing employerinitiated accretions should apply, as they are slightly more protective of
employee interests. Specifically, the union and employer would be
required to obtain signed and written statements of support for the accretion
from 30 percent of both the group to be accreted and the preexisting unit.
If these are successfully obtained, the accretion question would then be
presented to both sets of employees in a secret ballot election, with the
question being decided by a majority of votes from each group.

251. Some might argue that deference to employee-choice would unlawfully cede the
Board's § 9 authority to employees. It's important to remember, however, that the Board's
§ 9 authority exists "in order to assure the employees the fullest freedom in exercising the
rights guaranteed by this Act .. " National Labor Relations Act 29 U.S.C. § 154(b) (2002).
So any reasonable Board practice that accomplishes this goal is not unlawful.
Because even under the community of interest balancing test the Board claims to
consider the employees' desires as one factor in the analysis, and these factors have no fixed
weight, one can look at accretion elections as simply the Board doing the balancing test, and
giving the "employee desire" factor a determinative and controlling weight. Nobody seems
to think that the present balancing test constitutes unlawful delegation of power, so it may
be helpful to see the propriety of accretion elections in the construct of the balancing test.
Thus, if the Board wanted to be abundantly cautious, after the election it could go through
the motions of analyzing the accretion according to the overwhelming community of interest
balancing test, all the while giving the "employee choice" factor the greatest weight, a
practice it is free to adopt even without accretion elections.
252. There may be nothing sinister about this cooperative endeavor, and that it might
reflect an understanding that the employees' financial success is inextricably tied to the
employer's financial fate. When dealing with the employees' fundamental fights, however,
it is better to err on the side of caution.
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Rival Unions Seeking Different Accretions

Sometimes two competing unions each seek to accrete a group of
employees to their respective units,253 often with one union obtaining the
254
support of the employer.
Under the proposed election system, the same
rules that apply to employer-supported accretions would apply to rivalunion accretion cases. Thus, to obtain an accretion election, either union
would be required to obtain authorization cards from thirty percent of both
sets of employees. For example, consider a scenario where Union A
represents the employees in Unit A, and Union B represents the employees
in Unit B, and nobody represents Group C, the accretable group. To obtain
an accretion election to accrete Group C to Unit A, Union A would have to
obtain written statements of support from thirty percent of the employees in
Unit A and thirty percent of the employees in Group C, the group to be
accreted. For the competing union, Union B, to be placed on the ballot
alongside its competitor, it would simply have to show support from one
Group C employee and one Unit B employee, just as in a normal
representation election.
The election would then be conducted among all three groups,
permitting the Group C employees to choose accretion to Unit A, Unit B,
or no accretion at all. Where both a majority of Unit A voters and Unit B
voters support the accretion, the question will come down to the sentiments
expressed in the votes of Group C. Where none of the three choices
receives a majority,2 5 a re-run election would be held between the two
leading choices. As with other elections, in the runoff balloting the
256
majority wins.
If the majority elects not to join either Unit A or Unit B,
another accretion election could not be held for at least one year.

253. See, e.g., Staten Island Univ. Hosp. v. NLRB, 24 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 1994).
254. See, e.g., Kaynard v. Mego Corp., 633 F.2d 1026, 1029 (2d Cir. 1980)(discussing
the relationship between the union and the employer).
255. The accretable employees actually have four choices, but the third and the fourth
appear on the ballot only as "no accretion." The four choices are: (1) accretion to Unit A;
(2) accretion to Unit B; (3) no accretion, but the founding of a new unit-specific union; or
(4) no accretion and no collective bargaining.
256. It could be argued that under the proposed election system the employer is left
without a voice or veto. It is true that the employer has no veto, but it certainly has a voice
insofar as it can campaign against a proposed accretion. True, an accretion that would prove
disruptive to the employer would be permitted so long as a majority of employees of the
group to be accreted support it. Making the employer's interest another factor in the
calculus unnecessarily complicates matters in light of the employers' demonstrated success
in opposing unions. See Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive
Product Markets, 69 CHI.-KNT L. REv. 3, 5-6 (1993) ("[E]mployers are resisting union
organizing drives, demanding wage concessions, and exploiting weaknesses in the labor law
that have existed from the very beginning (such as the right to hire permanent replacements
for economic strikers).").
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Employee-InitiatedAccretions

Frequently, newly acquired employees will be the first to realize the
benefits of union representation, if there are any to be gained in that
particular product market.257
When they perceive that employees
performing similar jobs are obtaining higher wages, they will likely seek
out a union, or union organizers, never known for their bashfulness, will
find the disgruntled employees. In that case, the respective union would
serve as their champion, and initiate the process of an accretion election or
the formation of a separate unit. The rules for union-initiated accretions
would therefore apply. Similarly, where the employer sees the benefits of
the accretion and supports it, the rules applicable to employer-initiated
accretions would apply.
It is also conceivable, however, that a rare situation will arise where
neither the union representing an established unit nor the employer desire
an accretion of a new group of employees. Perhaps the union barely has
support and fears that new employees will eventually tip the balance in
favor of decertification, or maybe the union objects to the expansion of the
workforce, believing that its members will receive less overtime pay, and
therefore it hopes eventually to force ouster of the accretable employees
through collective bargaining. 218 As for employer opposition, perhaps the
employer does not want an accretion because he would be forced to pay the
accretable employees the higher wages required under the unit's CBA. In
these situations, the group will be unable to obtain an accretion under the
proposed election system. Although this may seem unfair, 25 9 it is similar to
the result that would occur under the present system, as a union has no duty
257. Sometimes, despite their best efforts, unions cannot elicit additional benefits from
the employer due to circumstances beyond the control of unions or employers. Because
many employers must offer their goods or services at a competitive rate, and the profit
margin generated by this competitive rate does not allow for the wages and working
conditions that the union might otherwise hope to obtain, unionization will often make no
(positive) difference in the terms and conditions of employment.
Unions are most successful in raising wages and working conditions in noncompetitive markets, i.e., those markets where the employer has a monopoly or near
monopoly. In these instances, union gains come at the expense of consumers. See
Estreicher, supra note 255, at 21. ("[U]nion wage gains at the expense of profits are largely
confined to industries sheltered from vigorous competition.").
258. After all, the "main purpose of labor unions is to raise wages by suppressing
competition among workers .... " RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST
31 (2d ed. 1981). What better way to suppress competition than to coerce an employer not
to deal with a group of non-union employees.
259. If it is any consolation to these employees, unions often find themselves in the same
boat. "Simply to get its foot in the door, the union must either find an unhappy workforce or
help stoke unhappiness in an organizing campaign." Estreicher, supra note 255, at 125. If it
fails to accomplish either of these goals, a union will not be able to obtain majority support,
and will remain an agent without a principal.
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to seek an accretion of employees it does not represent. 26° Similarly, the

law does not impose a duty on employers to comply with their employees'
desire for an accretion in cases where the union is not willing to accept the
accretion. As under the present system, any unfairness is minimized by the
group's ability to form its own union, assuming it has a separate identity
and the Board will certify it as an appropriate unit. Thus, such employees
may still be able to bargain collectively with their employer.261

III.

THE ADVANTAGES OF AN ELECTION

A.

Utilizationof an Objective Criterion

SYSTEM FOR ACCRETIONS

Deciding accretion contests by means of employee elections presents a
number of advantages over the Board's present practice of utilizing the
overwhelming community of interest balancing test. For starters, it
provides an objective criterion for deciding accretion cases-majority
support-which is far superior to the present system where it's anyone's
guess as to how an accretion case will be decided. 262 Under the present
system, even when all of the circumstances relevant to the "community of
interest" test are known, it is difficult to predict how the Board will decide
an accretion case.263 Under an election system, the outcome is easily
ascertained: the majority rules. 264 No longer would the parties (or the
260. The union is the agent for its principals (the employees of the unit) and its only duty
is to serve its principals' interests in a lawful manner.
261. It should be noted, however, that even unorganized employees enjoy § 7 rights. So
even if the employees never form a union, they are not left unprotected by the NLRA.
262. FORKOSCH, supra note 165, at 689 ("The standards set up in the Act... are so broad
that, without more, it is conceivable that any set of facts could become 'appropriate' so as to
certify any kind or type of unit."). Of course, in ordinary unit determination cases, the
malleability of the "appropriateness" is less burdensome on employees to the extent that
they have the power to vote either for or against the proposed union. If a union is defeated,
the parties can eventually seek another unit determination that more fully comports with
employee interests.
263. See, e.g., Cont'l Web Press, Inc. v. NLRB, 742 F.2d 1087, 1089 (7th Cir. 1984)
("The Board has a standard: it will approve a unit if but only if the members have a
'community of interest.' But the words provide little direction."); THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW, supra note 25, at 452. ("Community of interest is not susceptible to precise definition
or to mechanical application."); Strom, supra note 26, at 81 ("Such a complex multi-part
test inevitably means that different individuals will reach different results.").
264. Besides the pure benefit of permitting employees to exercise a fight of selfdetermination, accretion elections have the additional advantage of keeping the Board's
Also,
acknowledged biases at least one step removed from the accretion decision.
government has consistently proven itself "spectacularly unqualified for guiding a modem
economy," and that includes the labor component of the economy. GEORGE F. WILL, "The
Fatal Conceit", in THE LEVELING WIND: POLITICS, THE CULTURE AND OTHER NEWS 314
(1994). By moving the Board further away from the nucleus of the accretion decision,
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Board) manipulate the evidence to obtain the desired result. For example,
under the present system employers sometimes alter their internal structure
and policies so as to increase their chances of prevailing in an accretion
265
Where the Board perceives these shenanigans, it will remove
battle.
them from the accretion calculus,266 but there is always the chance that the

Board will not detect them, or that the employer can supply a pretextual
justification that will insulate its misdeeds. Because of the amorphous
nature of the balancing test, it is possible for an employer-or a union-to
prevail in an accretion case based on its deceit.
Under an election system, however, this would be impossible, unless
the employer were able to stuff the ballot box without being detected.
Elections make victory by deceit more difficult. In contrast, the multifactored balancing creates numerous opportunities for the parties to
manufacture evidence in support of their respective positions. One of the
chief virtues of the election system, therefore, is its ability to prevent
parties from distorting the result of an accretion case. True, as in all
elections, the interested parties simply re-target their deceit machines at the
electorate, but the employees, better than anyone else, are in the best
position to ascertain a "snow job" when they encounter one. As they are
well connected to their own interests, they should be the ones to decide
who is telling the truth. Furthermore, there already exists a system of labor
election law that is designed to enhance the viability of truth. Since it is
already applied to representation elections, it could easily be applied to
accretion elections.267

While this democratic system may not be a perfect one, it does have
the advantage of setting forth an objective criterion for accretions (the
majority prevails); importantly, the weight of this one criterion never
fluctuates and thus is not subject to manipulation. Unions, employers, and
employees also know in advance what they must do to obtain or prevent an
accretion, making all parties equal, at least in this one respect. Compare
these aspects of the proposed election system to the present "community of
interest" analysis, where it often seems that the Board is reciting post hoc
justifications for a pre-ordained accretion decision. 68 To the extent that the
elections protect accretion decisions from government incompetence.
265. Armco Inc. v. NLRB, 832 F.2d 357, 363 (6th Cir. 1987).
266. Id. at 364 ("[Tlhe uniformity in wages, hours, and terms of employment is the result
of the disputed conduct: the application of the Steelworkers' contract to the coke plant
employees" and was discounted accordingly).
267. The Board already has experience with unit determination elections, which are
similar to the proposed accretion elections. See, e.g., Hamilton Test Sys., Inc. v. NLRB,
743 F.2d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Under certain circumstances, the Board conducts 'selfdetermination' elections that allow the employees to determine the unit."). So it would not
need to create a whole new system to deal with accretion elections.
268. This has led various courts to criticize the Board. As the Ninth Circuit stated:
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present system is susceptible to being hijacked by Board bias, an accretion
election will create confidence in the system. No longer can a thumb-or a
fist-be placed on the scale. An accretion will succeed or fail based on its
ability to achieve majority support, 269 and at the end of the day, regardless
of the final result, employers, unions, and employees will know that they
received fair treatment.
B.

Ease of Application, Reduced Expense

To put it mildly, "The Board's test for whether an accretion has
occurred is by no means straightforward. 2 70 "If one utilizes the present
accretion analysis.., the answer one arrives at will depend on a myriad of
factors, the sum of which is not predictable even to the most experienced
labor lawyers. 27 ' Indeed, it is the difficulty of application and the lack of
predictable results that has resulted in so much criticism of the Board's
accretion analysis. Accretion elections can change that. Holding an
accretion election would prove far less cumbersome than the present
system of balancing a host of factors, the weight of which nobody can
fathom until the Board announces its decision. Even then, it is impossible
to determine the weight each factor was given, much less the meter by
which their weight was measured.
Furthermore, the present system of litigating accretions can prove
expensive, which can have substantial consequences for impecunious
unions or employers. Under an election system, because the Board
conducts the election, the parties need not waste their time and money
gathering evidence relating to the fourteen community of interest factors.
True, they will probably expend money to "educate" the electorate, but
It would.., be helpful to reviewing Courts of Appeals if future Board decisions
of this sort would more carefully analyze the competing considerations
involved, including the claims of previous decisions for some precedential
value. It is true that "whether or not a particular operation constitutes an
accretion or a separate unit turns, of course, on the entire congeries of facts in
each case." That truth does not, however, preclude the need for rational and
reasonably consistent assessments of such factual situations.
NLRB v. Food Employers Council, Inc., 399 F.2d 501, 505 (9th Cir. 1968).
269. To this extent, accretion by popular election might also encourage unions to be
more responsive to the needs of its members. Because it will require their explicit support
to grow by accretion, conscientious employees will only permit accretions when they
believe they have been well-served by their union.
270. Strom, supra note 26, at 80. Mr. Strom argues that the Board should give greater
deference to accretion clauses in CBAs, and arbitration decisions interpreting the application
of these clauses. Although this would obviate some of the problems associated with the
community of interest balancing test, accretion clauses theoretically allow employers and
unions to decide accretion questions without input from the affected employees.
271. Miner, supra note 213, at 516.
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those expenses can be minimized, and certainly do not require expensive
litigation attorneys. For example, union members can volunteer to get the
message about unions out to their co-workers.
C.

Maximization of Employee Freedom

A system of accretion that utilizes elections is also superior to the
present system in that it more directly serves employee freedom, "the
primary consideration of union determination. '7 2 Instead of simply paying
lip service to the employees' desires, and instead of diluting those desires
in the complex stew of a multi-factored balancing test, 73 elections allow
employees to have the maximum freedom to determine whether to
associate with other employees for the purpose of collective bargaining.
The right of expressive association is one of the fundamental freedoms of
Americans, such that it is safeguarded by the First Amendment of the
274

Constitution. 4
It is constitutionally protected because the right to
communicate, particularly group speech concerning labor matters, is
considered a fundamental right and essential to the survival of civilized
271
society.

Although private unions are not constrained by constitutional
provisions, the ideals expressed in the First Amendment manifest
themselves in particular provisions of the NLRA. Specifically, § 1 provides
that the NLRB is designed to protect "the exercise by workers of full
self-organization,
and designation of
freedom of association,
representatives of their own choosing .... ,276 Similarly, §7 provides that
employees have the right "to bargaining collectively through
representatives of their own choosing ... .,,277 "One of the principal
policies of the national labor laws-that embodied in § 7-is the protection
of the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization,
designation of representatives of their own choosing for the purposes of

272. Pac. Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1978).
273. Recall that at least the Sixth Circuit does not even consider the desires of employees
in making accretion decisions. NLRB v. Catherine McCauley Health Ctr., 885 F.2d 341,
345 (6th Cir. 1989) ("'Employee desires,' an additional factor frequently included in other
circuits, is not a relevant factor in this circuit."); Armco, Inc. v. NLRB, 832 F.2d 357 (6th
Cir. 1987); NLRB v. Am. Seaway Foods, Inc., 702 F.2d 630, 633 n.3 (6th Cir. 1983) (per
curiam); NLRB v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 428 F.2d 479, 484 (6th Cir. 1970).
274. See Roberts v. U. S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); see Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977) ("Our decisions establish with unmistakable clarity that the
freedom of an individual to associate for the purpose of advancing beliefs and ideas is
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.").
275. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103 (1940).
276. 29 U.S.C. § 151(1992).
277. 29 U.S.C. § 157(1992).
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negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment. 278 The right to
select their own bargaining representative "is the predominant
consideration under § 7 of the Act and is to be restricted only under
'compelling conditions.' ' 279 Employee choice as to whom will be their
representative should be jealously protected by the Board and the courts.
In deciding accretion cases, then, the Board must "'assure to employees the
fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed' by the National Labor
Relations Act. ' 2s0 Yet "in some circumstances the Board permits an
accretion where majority status is not demonstrated at the new unit, ' 28' and
in many others it doesn't even bother to consider the employees' opinions
or desires.282
There could be no better way to prevent this from occurring-and at
the same time preserve § 7 freedoms-than by allowing employees to
determine their own fate vis-A-vis their selection of a collective bargaining
agent.283 In accordance with § 7 and its corollaries, where a group of
employees seeks, through an accretion, to join its voice with an established
unit, it should have the right to do so, regardless of what the Board thinks
about any particular case.284 Just as the government cannot prohibit
expressive associations, so too the Board should not be permitted-through
its vague overwhelming community of interest balancing test-to prevent
employees from associating with an organized unit for purposes of
collective bargaining. An accretion system that relies on elections ensures
that employees enjoy the fundamental right to associate with others for
purposes of advancing their shared beliefs and interests, and thereby serves
a key purpose of the NLRA.2851 Just as important, it prevents accretable
employees from having to associate with a union they would rather avoid,
or at least allows them to voice their opinion on the matter.

278. Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 512 (5th
Cir. 1982).
279. Boire v. Bhd. of Teamsters, 479 F.2d 778, 797 (5th Cir. 1973).
280. NLRB v. Catherine McCauley Health Ctr., 885 F.2d 341, 344 (6th Cir. 1989)
(quoting Indianapolis Glove Co. v. NLRB, 400 F.2d 363, 368 (6th Cir. 1968)).
281. Boire, 479 F.2d at 797. The Fifth Circuit goes on to note that these cases are rare.
Nevertheless, to the employees affected, these decisions are hardly minor.
282. See, e.g., Scripps Newspaper Corp., 329 N.L.R.B. 854, 1999 NLRB LEXIS 740, at
*17-18 (1999) (listing the factors the Board considers in accretion cases; "employee desire"
is noticeably absent).
283. Of course, the Board might think, paternalistically, that it knows better than
employees.
284. This presumes that the employees of the established unit are amenable to this
joinder.
285. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994)(noting that it is the policy of the United States to
protect "the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing ....
").
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GreaterProtectionof the Unit Employees' Rights

The election system proposed above serves to protect the rights, not
only of the group to be accreted, but also of the employees of the
preexisting unit. Presently, such employees don't have a direct hand in the
accretion decision. The Supreme Court has held in the First Amendment
context that: "There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the
internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces
the group to accept members it does not desire.2' 8 6 "The forced inclusion
of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group's freedom of
expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a significant
way the group's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints. 287
Although these are general principles of constitutional law-which are
qualified in some ways in the labor context -the reasoning behind these
principles is equally applicable to unions. Just as the government should
not be able to force groups founded to express particular points of view to
accept members who don't share those same opinions, a unit of
employees-acting in concert to represent a particular bargaining
position-should not be forced to accept an accretion that would disrupt
their expressive activities, including their right to bargain effectively with
their employer. They should have the right to exclude an accretable unit
when addition of the accretable unit would not serve the goals of the
preexisting unit's employees.
Under the present "community of interest" balancing test, this concern
is merely one factor that the Board will consider, and rather obliquely at
that. It can easily be overlooked, or overborne by a strong showing on the
other factors. The election system proposed above, however, empowers the
members of the established unit to veto proposed accretions. 21' By
entrusting the employees of the unit with the power to block an accretion,
they have the ability to prevent accretions that otherwise would destroy the
unity of the bargaining unit. In doing so, the election system is superior to
the overwhelming community of interest balancing test, which, as
demonstrated above, has proved unwieldy and unpredictable.
Furthermore, by placing this authority to block an accretion in the unit
employees-as opposed to just the union representing them-the ballot
system gives the unit employees greater power and autonomy, not only
286. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
287. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
288. It is true that the "collective bargaining system as encouraged by Congress and
administered by the NLRB of necessity subordinates the interests of an individual employee
to the collective interests of all employees in a bargaining unit." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171, 182 (1967). This does not mean, however, that an employee should have no say in the
way the union conducts its affairs, particularly in its decision to expand greatly the size of
the bargaining unit.
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with respect to the accretion, but also with respect to control over their
union representatives. Thus, if a union desires an accretion, it will be
forced to obtain the consent of the employees. Perhaps in some instances,
the union will discover that unit employees have not been particularly
happy with the union's leadership or its efforts. The ballot system allows
employees to voice their disapproval by vetoing a union-endorsed
accretion. By blocking the accretion, they have the ability to express their
lack of confidence in the union through a means less drastic than a
decertification election, thereby furthering one of the goals of the NLRA:
industrial stability. "Bargaining unit employees in the real world have
'
limited opportunities to police their bargaining agent."289
The right to vote
in accretion elections gives union members an opportunity to patrol the
union hierarchy and inflict a minor punishment for unsatisfactory
representation. They can utilize this veto power to warn union leaders of
the organization's impending demise if it fails to change course. By doing
so, the employees also protect the interests of the group that was to be
conjoined, as these employees will be saved from joining a unit that is
unsatisfied with its bargaining representative. In short, the freedom of
choice intimately connected to the proposed accretion elections can serve
many of the interests that the NLRA was designed to protect, and to a much
greater extent than the Board's present use of an archaic and unfair
balancing test.
IV. THE DOWNSIDE OF AN ACCRETION ELECTION SYSTEM

A.

Overinclusiveand Heterogeneous Units

An election system is the best system available to judge the propriety
of accretions, and is certainly superior to the present community of interest
balancing test. That is not to say, however, that strong arguments cannot
be marshaled in opposition. Perhaps the best argument against an election
system for accretions is that it might not ensure that there is a community
of interest between the group to be accreted and the established unit.
Under the present system, an accretion cannot be approved by the Board
unless an overwhelming community of interest is shown 290 although it is
not clear exactly when this level of community exists. The requirement of
showing substantial similarity of interest is supposed to prevent the
289. Samuel Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, 21 J.
reprintedin COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 501, 505.

LAB.

RES. No. 2 (2000),

290. But recall that the accretion can occur even when such a strong affinity is not
shown, so long as it occurs with the employees' consent. In this sense, the present system is
no different from the proposed election system.
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creation of overinclusive units:
When the unit is overinclusive, several dangers exist. A conflict in
interest may develop... ; the likely result is that the interests of the

minority will be overlooked or intentionally discounted. The conflict might
also lead to instability in employer-employee relations. Thus, conjoining
employees who lack the necessary community of interests threatens both
employee rights and industrial peace. 29'
It is the fear of this overinclusiveness that spurs unions to oppose large
units. Accretions, even those with the popular support of the employees,
can create the danger of overinclusive unions and the destructive effects
that they can entail. It is for this reason that
employees' wishes cannot supplant all other considerations; as
the Board has pointed out
in other contexts, the parties cannot by
consent override the Act's policies or the Board's
authority. Employee choice cannot
be used to justify a gerrymandered unit, particularly
when ... it may not reflect the employees' judgment

of their common interests,
but may simply evince
292
employee self-interest.
But these fears of election-generated overinclusiveness are
exaggerated and largely unfounded. Because unions will have a full
opportunity to oppose employer-instigated accretion elections, they can
communicate any concerns about conflicting interests to both non-unit and
unit members. They retain the power of education and persuasion, which,
if properly exercised, will sufficiently protect against overinclusiveness.
Notably, the dangers associated with overinclusiveness have not
materialized where the Board has officially adopted accretion elections as
the means by which it judges community of interest. If an employer or
another union seeks to accrete the group to a "gerrymandered" unit, the
employees of the group to be accreted can: (1) vote to reject joining it; (2)

291. Pac. Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1032, 1045 (9th Cir. 1978).
[T]he more homogenous the group of workers composing a proposed unit is
with respect to the terms and conditions of employment-the greater, in other
words, the community of interest among those workers is-the more likely they
are to be well served by a single, exclusive bargaining representative, and the
less likely there is to be a dissatisfied minority.
Cont'l Web Press, Inc. v. NLRB, 742 F.2d 1087, 1090 (7th Cir. 1984). But as Judge Posner
also notes, homogeneity comes at a price: reduced size and power. At some level,
heterogeneity is accepted because this acceptance permits a larger and more powerful unit.
292. Pac. Southwest Airlines, 587 F.2d at 1044.
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agree to join it where they believe it will serve their best interests; (3) seek
to form their own unit; or (4) seek accretion to another unit. Because the
majority rules, there is no danger-as there is under the present systemthat the Board will railroad the employees into an objectionable unit or one
that won't protect their interests. Under the accretion election system, the
employees' interests are safeguarded by the body most capable of zealously
defending them: the employees themselves.
The community of interest test is only "necessary in order to preserve
the employees' § 7 rights. 29 3 When those rights are protected-to a
greater extent than the community of interest test protects them-through
secret ballot elections, there is little need to bother with the community of
interest test. Because the Board defers to the employees' determination of
what is an appropriate unit in other types of cases, there is no reason why it
should not do so in accretion cases. An election system that adequately
protects employee interests should not be criticized simply because it fails
to incorporate a less predictable balancing test.
Of course, some employees might be lured into voting to join a unit
with which they have little in common simply because they expect higher
wages and better benefits if they join that unionized unit.194 The objection
might arise that these employees are not making their decision on the basis
of the community of interest they share with the unit, but on the basis of
their desire to obtain better wages. the problem with this objection is that
the desire for better wages and benefits is a common interest that binds all
unionized workers, and indeed, all workers. Indeed, it is this desire that
brings together many workers who otherwise would have little in common.
So a unit that is bound primarily by this common interest is not necessarily
a weak organization. The desire for better wages and working conditions
can be a remarkably cohesive force.
If employees are willing to join together to obtain better wages and
working conditions, they should be permitted to do so, despite the fact that
they don't share a complete commonality of interests. If a broad interest
such as opposition to taxation without representation was sufficient to
compel the people of thirteen diverse colonies to unionize,295 the desire to
obtain better terms and conditions of employment should be sufficient for
diverse employees to unionize through an accretion where, like the
colonists, they vote to support this confederation.

293. Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 521 (5th
Cir. 1982).
294. At the core, it is presumably this desire for better terms and conditions of
employment that motivated all union members to join.
295. JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 39 (1996)
("Opposition to taxation without representation provided a common denominator for the
colonies.").
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As Judge Posner has noted, all employees of a firm can be said to
share some community of interest. 296 "There is a sense in which all people
employed in the same firm, the same craft, or even the same industry share
a community of interest .... The Board has never specified the level of
homogeneity required for an accretion, but there is no reason to believe that
employees cannot ascertain the appropriate level of community at least as
well as the Board's balancing test. Once employees make this assessment,
they can cast their vote accordingly. True, they may err, but the probability
of error is no greater for the employees than for the Board whose members,
after all, don't work day in and day out with the relevant employees. The
effected employees have primary access to the relevant information.
Furthermore, unlike the affected employees, the Board members never
suffer the consequences of an erroneous accretion determination.
Presumably, then, the employees have greater incentive to carefully weigh
the competing interests relevant to the "community of interest" question.
Finally, although the proposed system of accretion elections
adequately protects against overinclusiveness and ensures that a
community of interest exists, if the Board believed that elections do not
sufficiently safeguard unit cohesion, it could always modify the election
proposal to include an application of the community of interest test as a
second step in the accretion analysis, after also modifying it to favor
accretions that were supported by the majority of employees in the
proposed secret ballot election. Under such a system, if the employees
voted for an accretion sponsored by their employer, the Board would then
ask whether the employees of the respective groups had so little in common
that they shared no reasonable community of interest.2 98 The union
opposing the accretion would have the substantial burden-perhaps by
clear and convincing evidence-of proving that the employees do not share
a community of interest. The Board would operate under the presumption
that a popularly supported accretion was appropriate unless there were a
strong showing under the community of interest test that the employees had
almost no common interest with respect to collective bargaining. Of
course, inclusion of this post-election challenge procedure would resurrect
some of the same problems and inefficiencies that plague the Board's
present use of the community of interest test. So it should be adopted
reluctantly, used sparingly, and then only when there are substantial doubts
about the common interests of the two groups.

296. Cont'l Web Press, Inc., 742 F.2d at 1089.
297. Id.
298. This determination could be made before an election too, so long as the Board uses
the same presumptions and assigns the burden of proof to the party opposing the accretion.
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B.

Delegationof the Board'sPower to Determine Appropriate Units

Another objection to the accretion election system is that it constitutes
an improper delegation of the Board's power to determine an "appropriate
unit." As the Ninth Circuit has explained: "Before any self-determination
election is had, regardless what type of employees are involved, the Board
must first determine what units would be appropriate. The Board cannot
delegate this preliminary duty to the employees., 299 But the Ninth Circuit
is only partially correct.
It's true that Congress entrusted the Board with the duty to determine
which units are "appropriate."3 °° Congress, however, did not instruct the
Board as to how it was to make that determination, leaving it instead to the
Board's discretion.3 1 So, if the Board exercised its discretion to make
accretion determinations according to the wishes of the employees in the
affected groups, it seems that this would be permissible under the Act. As
it stands now, under the community of interest test, "[e]mployee choice can
tip the balance in determining which of two equally appropriate units
should be preferred. 30 2 If that's so, then employee choice is already the
deciding factor in some accretion cases. And if it already serves as the
deciding factor in accretion cases, there's no reason why it couldn't be the
sole factor the Board considers in deciding whether there is a substantial
community of interest among two groups of employees.
It seems likely that the Board has the discretion to adopt the wishes of
the affected employees as the sole factor it considers in its community of
interest analysis. As the Ninth Circuit noted: "Although it may consider
other factors, the Board's discretion is broadest when exercised in favor of
employee freedom."30

3

Nothing is more conducive to employee freedom

than asking the employees themselves what they would prefer, and what
they believe is in their best interests. Furthermore, it's worth noting that
the Board has utilized secret ballot elections to decide accretion cases in the
past:
[T]he Board has held that even though it might have found an
overall unit appropriate on a representation petition, and thus
have given all employees at all locations an equal voice in the
initial representation decision, it would not "under the guise of
accretion, compel a group of employees, who may constitute a
separate appropriate unit, to be included in an overall unit

299. Pac. Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1032, 1038 n.10 (9th Cir. 1978).
300. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1994).
301. Cont'l Web Press, Inc., 742 F.2d at 1089 ("[Slection 9(b) is a broad delegation of
power to the Board").
302. Pac. Southwest Airlines, 587 F.2d at 1044.
303. Id.
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without allowing those employees the opportunity of expressing
their preference in a secret election or by some other ' 3evidence
4
that they wish to authorize the Union to represent them.

0

This practice of ensuring support through secret elections makes
perfect sense, and therefore should be expanded through the system
suggested above. After all, who is more qualified than the employees
themselves to determine whether they share a substantial community of
interest with employees in an organized unit? 30 5 Thus, relying on employee
voting to determine the question of whether employees share a community
of interest is neither novel nor prohibited under present law. It is simply
underutilized.
The permissibility of using majority elections to determine accretion
cases is also supported by the National Labor Relations Act itself. The Act
already requires the Board, in some instances, to defer to the wishes of the
majority of employees when determining appropriate units. For example,
the Act provides that the Board cannot decide that a unit composed of both
professional and non-professional employees is appropriate "unless 30a6
majority of such professionalemployees vote for inclusion in such unit.
Similarly, the Board shall not "decide that any craft unit is inappropriate
for such purposes on the ground that a different unit has been established
by a prior Board determination, unless a majority of. the
employees in the
. ,,307
proposed craft unit vote againstseparate representation.
These provisions demonstrate several things relevant to accretion
elections. First, Congress perceived elections as a sufficient way to settle
which units were "appropriate units." Because Congress explicitly made
elections a means of determining appropriate units, it is certainly within the
Board's discretion to use elections in determining the appropriateness of an
accretion. Second, these provisions demonstrate the importance Congress
placed on employee choice in determining appropriate units. Although it
didn't require elections in all circumstances, Congress wanted elections to
govern the more difficult cases, demonstrating that employee choice was

304. Boire v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 479 F.2d 778, 798-99 (5th Cir. 1973) (quoting
Melbet Jewelry Co., 180 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (1969)).
305. It might be argued that the Board is more qualified to make this determination,
based on its particular expertise in this area. But as many prominent jurists-such as
Learned Hand and Abe Fortas-have recognized, the expertise of administrative agencies is
overemphasized, exaggerated, and is indeed non-existent in many cases. Hand "repeatedly
doubted the political neutrality and genuine expertise of the administrative agencies .... "
GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 473 (1994).

Demonstrating

the ignorance of even basic facts related to their "area of expertise," Abe Fortas "enjoyed
telling the story of his fellow AAA lawyer Lee Pressman, who thought farmers grew
macaroni." KALMAN, supra note 114, at 30-31 (footnote omitted).
306. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1)(1994).
307. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(2)(1994).

2002]

ACCRETION ELECTIONS

paramount. Requiring elections in accretion cases similarly puts employee
choice in that exalted position. It permits members of the unit and the
group to be accreted to decide whether the dccretion would result in the
formation of an appropriate unit.
V.

CONCLUSION

The present system used by the Board to decide accretion cases-the
overwhelming community of interest balancing test-has proved
unpredictable and is easily manipulated by the parties and the Board itself.
It leads to no clear rules or standards to guide litigants, and therefore
foments further litigation. Accordingly, the Board should discard the
balancing test in accretion cases. In its place, the Board should adopt a
secret ballot election system.
Because the Board has broad discretion in unit determinations and
accretions, adopting an election system is well within its power. There is
no statutory requirement that the Board use the community of interest
balancing test. 108 An election system would be a great improvement over
the present test, as it would simplify accretion cases, make them subject to
objective criteria, and maximize the employees' § 7 freedom to bargain
collectively according to their own associational interests.
The accretion election system outlined above also protects existing
unions from destabilizing accretions, and ensures that accretions occur only
with the consent of the established unit. In short, an election system would
better preserve employee freedom and industrial stability, and would do so
with less expense and trouble for the Board and the affected parties.

308. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. McLeod, 302 F.2d 354, 355 (2d Cir. 1962) ("[T]he
Board's action in disregarding its own 'accretion' doctrine is clearly not unconstitutional nor
violative of any specific command of the statute.").

